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A MODEL OF CRIMINAL DISPOSITIONS: 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO OFFICIAL DISCRETION 
IN SENTENCING 
LARRY I. PALMER* 
Professor Palmer proposes a new model of criminal dispositions 
which would replace official discretion at sentencing with judicially 
created standards for sentencing officials. In Part I he outlines the 
role of the appellate judiciary in developing an interest analysis 
to enunciate standards to guide criminal dispositions. In Parts II 
and III he examines the roles of administrative agencies and leg-
islatures in perfecting the dispositional process under standards in-
itially ari.iculated by the judiciary. Professor Palmer emphasizes the 
concept of individual liberty as a central value of society and shows 
how a new system of criminal dispositions can enhance that value 
as a goal of the criminal law. · 
INTRODUCTION 
A man shouting "holdup" may set in motion the machinery of state 
intervention through the criminal process, leading to the conviction and 
detention of the robber. Appellate courts then may be asked to rf?olve 
a host of legal issues dealing with events occurring before and after 
the shout to determine whether continued state control over the· ropber 
is legitimate. For instance, an appellate court may decide that a hearing 
is needed to determine the admissibility of the victim's sworn testimony 
• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University-Camden; A.B., 1966, Harvard Col-
lege; LL.B., 1969, Yale University. 
Part of the research done in conjunction with this article was supported by a grant 
from the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency of the State of New Jersey. The 
opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the 
opinions or conclusions of the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency. 
I would also h"ke to acknowledge the aid o£ my colleague, Professor Roger Clark, 
who was kind enough to read a draft of this paper, and Professor Franklin Zimring for 
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that the convicted robber was the man who held him up1 and might 
explore such factors as the lighting at the scene of the holdup or the 
nature of any police line-up.2 More frequently, in modern American 
criminal law, appellate courts will be asked to determine the legality <:>f 
po1ice investigative practices in the particular case. Did the police ar-
rive soon enough after the shout to be ·in ·hot pursuit? Was the search 
of the entire house proper under the circumst~nces? Was the seizure of 
itern,!!_.of the robber's clothing as well as weapons supposedly used in 
the holdup proper? If the seizure of the iterp.s was improper according 
to some legal standard, the ultimate question· on appeal will be whether 
the items should have been admitte.d at trial 3:nd whether the conviction 
may stand.3 · 
While the articulated goal of . the appellate review described above 
might be t}J.e protection of some notion of individualliberty,4 ironicallyt 
none of the corirts reviewing the trial judge's many decisions were con-
cerned that our robber, who was convicted of armed robbery, was sen-
tenced to ~ 4: ,years in prison. Nor did· the fact that other judges in the 
same jurisdic?c;m might have sentenced him to five or 20 years raise a 
legaLissue for appellate. court resolutipn~5 Assuming that the 14 year 
sentence is appropriate, a prison official could initiate, without appellate 
review, a· psychiatric examination process leading to indefinite confine-
ment' of o'ur robber in a special institution for _treatment. · 
A simple explanation of this state of· affalrs in American criminal law 
is that, despite the urging of many commentators, 6 sentencing is not 
generally subject to appellate review. Glven the close judicial scrutiny 
of pretrial events and of the trial itself, some explanation of the prevail-
ing practice of unreviewability of sentencing and other post-conviction 
matters is in order. If the seizure of the robber's clothing by the police 
pr(!Sel).ts a reviewable issue, so should the decision to imprison him for 
' . ' -, 
lSee <;;Uberty. Califoplia, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218,227 (1967). 
2 See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-99 (1972). 
• 3 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967). 
4Jd. 'at 312 (Fortas, J., concurring). "I fear that in gratuitously striking down the 
'mere evidence' rule, which distinguished members of this Court have acknowledged 
as essential to eriforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against general searches, the 
Court ne~dlessly deSt:roys, root and branch, a basic pai:1: .of liberty's heritage." ld. 
5 See generally Coburn, Disparity in Sentences fl'Tld Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25" 
RUTGERS L. REv. 207 (1971); Levin, Urban Politics and judicial Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES.193_ ·(1972) •. 
6 See. generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMuM STANDAlu>s FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE, STANDARDs 
RELATING 'To APPELLATE REviEw OF SENTENCES, ·Appendix D, 158-60 (Approved Draft, 
1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDs]; Frankel, Lawlesmess in Sentencing, 41 U. 
CIN. L. REv. I, 26 (1972). ' 
.14 years rather than pl~ce him on probation.7 Sirnila.t:Jy, de.cisjons, ~on­
cerning our robber's parole or. his transfer to a special treatment fa~ility 
should be subject to judicial review. The degree of inattent~on. t? our 
robber's post-conviction treatment has led one commentator to char:-
acterize the prevailing practice as "lawlessness in sentencing." 8 
The prevailing practices exist in part because of the legal system~s 
willingness to tolerate a coexistence of free agents and legally bound 
agents. The police and, to a d~gree, the trial judge legally are bou,nd to 
follow rules in their treatment of our robber. In contrast, the oflicials 
involved in post-conviction decision making virtually are unrestricted 
by legal rules in their dealings with our robber. This dichotomy is a re-
flection of the conflicting goals that . our legal system pursues. We 
acknowledge that the criminal should be subject to social ·c-ontrol since 
he held up the victim, but we· also are concerned that we ·protect his 
individual rights, particularJy before labelling him a "cr~al." As a 
result the legally bound ageo.ts are required to follow n~rowly pre-
scribed rules in dealing with the robber in order to protect him,· but the 
free agents are allowed broad (ijscretion .to insure that he gets th~ punish-
ment he deserves. . · : . · · · 
. Thus, the trial judge is given broad discretion to sentenc;e and to "in-
dividualize" or tailor punishment to :fit our robber. An argument.to justi-
fy this discretion is that the individualization of punishment· through the 
creation of free agents best achieves the dual goals of "reformation and 
rehabilitation." 9 If the sentence is ill-suited to the individual defendant, 
the trial judge always is subject to reversal for abuse of disctetion;10 but, 
7Th~ maximum term of linpriso!!ffi~nt ·for arn:ted robb~ry .in . .M:;eyl;m,d i~ .20 y~ars. 
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 488 (1957'). The judge' is authorized to nnpose probation deSpite 
the fact that a niinlinum three yl';ar term is applicable to the general robbery statnte; 
See id. §§ 486, 643. More than one-half of all persons under state crllninal control are 
placed under supervised release in the. community rather than incarcerated. See THE 
Pl!EsmENT's CoMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JuSTICE, TAsK 
FoRCE REPoRT: CoRRECTioNs 27 (1967). See tflso R. CARm & L. WILKINs, PROJ34TION ANI> 
PAROLE 18 (1970). ' 
BSee FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 26; cf. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusnCE,127;41. (.1_969). 
But see H. PACKER, THE LIMITS oF THE CroMINAL SANCTION 139-45 (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as H. PACKER]. . ' · " .. .' . " · · 
9See Williams v. New York, 3~7 U.S. 241; 247-50 (1949). ·: " 
10 Se~. Leach v. United States, 353 F.2d 451, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United. States. :v. 
Wiley, 278 F.2d 500,503 (7th Cir.'l960). The trial court's use during sentendilg-bfin-
accurate information regarding the d!';fendant's prior crlininal record' has long been held 
a violation o£ due process •of law: ·See Townsend v. Burke, 33,4 U.S: 736; 740-41 {1948). 
The scope of the attack on the process of sentencing can be e;,:panded to'require·ll code 
of sentencing pro.cedure. Cf. Mempa .v •. Rh;1y, 389 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1967).; C.ohen; &n;. 
tencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v..rRhay,-47 
TEXAS L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1968h Pugli &·Carver,·Due Process and Senteni;i,ng: Fr()J1j'Mapp 
to. -Me1~pa to McGaut[Ja,- 49' TEXAs· L. REv.· 25 (1970).· · ,. • , · · . · ·~ : · •· 
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in 'Order to maintain the free agency system, such instances of appellate 
court intervention should be extremely rare. Belief in the efficacy of 
trial judge discretion in sentencing logically leads to the creation of other 
free agents. Thus, correction officials are given broad discretion in their 
application of penal policies to our robber, and legal doctrines have de-
veloped effecting judicial reluctance to influence or modify the actions 
of prison and parole officials.U A further argument in support of non-
reviewability is that the adoption of any particular penal policy to con-
trol the free agents in their dealing with our robber simply is not a judi-
cial function but rather that specific policies to guide correction officials 
or judges should be formulated by the legislature.1z The result of the 
prevailing practice, however, is that our robber probably will be treated 
haphazardly by the various free agents. 
While we close the curtain on our robber and leave him in the intra~ 
duction, the events occurring after his conviction are the focus of the 
pages that follow. The position taken is that his post-conviction treat-
ment must be the subject of legal review ~y the appellate courts. Our 
robber justifiably is subjected to society's control, but that does not re-
quire the uncontrolled use of free agents pending legislative action. 
FUr-thermore, the convicted individual is not truly protected by the 
practice of "individualized" punishment which only obscures the real 
issues of post-conviction treatment. The entire legal method developed 
from the doctrine of trial judge discretion needs to be replaced with a 
new mode of analysis compatible with modem notions of the goals of 
the criminal law. 
, - The alternative proposed is a method of legal analysis called "A Model 
of Criminal Dispositions" and is grounded on the belief that the legiti-
macy of post-conviction treatment demands that sentencing officials be 
governed by legal standards. The model is based upon three assumptions 
about modern American criminal law. First, trial judge sentencing is es-
sentially part of a broader category of legal decisions which may be 
termed "dispositions." The feature common to all dispositions is that an 
official is authorized by the legal system to exercise direct control 'Over 
individuals. The model will focus on the broad category of criminal dis-
positions, with a preference for minimizing the use of such controls.13 
11 See Note, Beyond the Ken uf the Courts: A Critique uf Judicial Refusal to Review 
the Complaints of Ccmvicts, 72 YALEL.J. 506 (1963). 
lZ See People v. Moore, 53 Cal. 2d 451, 348 P.2d 584, 2 Cal. Rptr. 6, cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 895 (1960); Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1932). But see People v. 
Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 242 A.2d 
333 (1968). 
13 The term "dispositions" is broader than "sentencing" since individuals are deprived 
of their liberty by some "civil" processes. See notes 186-224 infra and accompanying text. 
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Second, since dispositions will be assumed to serve a· different fur~ction 
from the adjudication of criminality, the same legal standards may not 
be useful for both; indeed as will be seen, different legal standards shquld 
govern the two types of decisions. Third, decisions concerning adjudica-
~on and disposition should be connected by overall goals or interests 
promoted by the criminal law. A subsidiary of this third assumption is 
that the judiciary is the appropriate agency to articulate these interests 
iJ;l. the area of dispositions as it already does through review of adjudica-
tions. This will require the courts to engage in an "interest analysis" 14 
by looking to the legislative policy behind the delineation of criminal 
oft:enses as well as the policies underlying the court-developed consti-
tutional limitations on criminal adjudication. Mter the appellate courts 
have developed this basic analysis for rule making in the area of disposi-
tions, the goal of judicial intervention in the correctional process should 
be the development of standards of judicial review of what are, in effect, 
criminal administrative agencies.15 
The rules of disposition developed under the model are applicable to 
some of the unresolved problems of "sentencing." Within the area of 
o;-ial judge sentencing, the model offers standards and accompanying 
policies to govern the decision to grant probation, the use of prior con-
victions, the imposition of multiple sentences, and the effect of an in-
dividual's non-cooperation. These rules of decision making for appellate 
and trial judge sentencing will be developed in Part I. Once the indi-
vidual is within the state confinement process, there are at least two areas 
-the administration of intra-prison discipline and parole determinations 
-where the model suggests standards which would protect individuals 
from improper exercise of administrative discretion. Part II will demon-
strate how the judiciary and correction officials should share this decision 
making responsibility. 
·By legislative directive the purpose of some of the state confinement 
processes may be articulated specifically as "non-criminal." Under ~he 
analysis proposed, however, the commitment of any individual by legal 
process involves a disposition. The analysis proposes some rules that 
would protect individuals within these specialized processes, regardless 
of the legislatively articulated goal of disposition. The Federal Youth 
Corrections Act, indeterminate sentencing schemes for women, a "family 
offense" statute, and several civil commitment processes are examined 
in light of the model's broad goal of minimizing the use of coercive legal 
As the criminal law is but one form of social and legal control, less coercive methods 
.should be employed whenever possible. 
14 See notes 31-35 infra and accompanying text. 
i5 See notes 157-185 infra and accompanying text. 
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power to control' individuals. Part Til thus offers an opportunity to ob.:. 
serve.-the appellate judiciary in its suggested role as catalyst for reform. 
Within the three broad assumptions developed above concerning the 
criminal law, the model essentially is an attempt to relate the disposition 
of the individual case and the interests which the criminal law is designed 
to promote. The model recognizes that courts, legislatures, and criminal 
administrative agencies make dispositional decisions from their particular 
institutional perspective. Underlying the legal standards proposed, how-
ever, is an assumption that all decision makers should acknowledge the 
disutility of criminal dispositions for all individuals whose conduct ordi-
narily would lead to an adjudication of "criminality." 16 Part IV will 
conclude with a discussion of issues left unresolved by the article but 
which are capable of resolution under the analysis proposed. ' 
PART I 
QuESTIONs oF jUDICIAL DisPosiTIONAL PoLICY 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISPOSITIONS 
At a time when official discretion in dispositions is the rule and modi-
fications are proposed, a constitutional framework for dispositions per-
forms two important functions. An appellate court restricted by con-
stitutional doctrine constantly must confront the question of the limits 
of its institutional role in modifying present sentencing practices. Fur-
thermore, such a framework will reemphasize the important function of 
the appellate court in questioning "inferior" decision malcers, a role 
which the Supreme Court undertook in the recent death penalty case 
of Furman v. GeorgiaP The eighth amendment, which addresses itself 
directly to the issue of limitations on dispositions, 18 and the fourteenth 
amendment provide the framework for determining the limitations on 
the legal system in its post-conviction treatment of individuals.19 
16 Professor Hart defines criminality as that conduct which, if duly shown tO havt:: 
taken place, will irtcur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation 
of the community. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW AND CoNTEMP, Pnon. 
401,416 (1958) •. 
17 408 .. U.S. 238 (1972): The nine divergent opinions in Furman reflect the difficulty 
the Court: had in imposing a constitutional analysis on an area theretofore guided prin-
cipally by discretion; the failure of the decisions to articulate more specific limitations 
on dispositions, therefore, should not be surprising. 
_ 18 T~e eighth amendment provides as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and uousual punishments inflicted." U.S. CaNST. 
amend:VIII.' · · 
19 The thirteenth amendment may also provide a broad principle of. limitation. "Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or any place subject 
1973] .. .... ! .. ', ' SE~ENCING 
One possible analysis of the \~igh~h am~ndment is a determination of 
what the Fo11nding Fathers deemed ~n appropriate mode .of disposition 
upon conviction.20 Under such, an historical analysis, corp0.ral punish-
to their jurisdiction." [d. amend. ·XIII, § 1. While sentencing or disposition may have been 
from the minds of the Framers, the "duly convicted" language could be given a· new 
interpretation and become an important source of principles in view of modern notions 
of what constitutes legitimate exercise of state power over individuals.· Justice ;B~ennan 
of the Michigan Supreme Court has indicated his belief that the thirteenth ~endment 
limits judicial discretion. See People v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 98, 191 N.W.2d 375, '382 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 41 U.SL.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973). 
In the course of his separate opinion Justice Brennan stated: 
I believe, however, that the United States Supreme Court was very, very 
wrong-dangerously, and illiberally wrong-in concluding th{!t a harsher. 
penalty could be imposed upon a defendant f.or ' ... conduct ... ocelli-ring · · 
after .•. the original sentencing .... ' . 
CoUrtS are empowered to mete out sentences for the conduct of which ·the 
defendant stands convicted. That conduct, and only that conduct, ha~ been 
established factually in the manner required by constitutional due process. 
Any other, subsequent, conduct with which the defendant has not been 
duly charged and of which he had not been duly convicted according to 
the Constitution and laws of the State and the Nation simply cmmot be made 
the basis for depriving a person of his liberty. 
The Thirteenth Amendment makes the point perfectly and abundantly 
clear. 
Id. at 98, 191 N.W.2d at 382. But see Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 369-72 (WD. 
Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304, 306. (8th Cir. 1971) (claim by state prisoners that thir-
teenth amendment limited correction official's discretion rejected). -
At a minimum, the thirteenth amendment might be used by a court to support its 
claim o£ the institutional capacity to promulgate rules, of constitutional and non-con-
stitutional dimension, concerning dispositions. 
20 The history of punishment in this country during colonial times discloses an atti.: 
tude towards those who deviate from society's norms which still persists today. Prior 
to the adoption of any constitutional. limitation on dispositions; the sanctions infticted, 
upon the deviant were designed to achieve a perceived social purpose. · Dur.ing the 
colonial period, the deviant or offender was viewed primarily as a sinner. To the Puritan 
mind, crime. an~ sin were synonymous. The frequent use of sanctiqns that IPade the 
offender-sinner a participant in the "punitive process" can be explained ·jl,l terms of ~ 
desire to reform the offender-sinner. See G. HASKINs, LAW AND Aumorurr.. IN EARLY 
MASsACHUSETTS 206 (1968). It was thought that sanctions that worked directly on the 
individual's conscience were most· effective. While some. forms of devian.c.e ·might re-
quire ouster -from the community, banishment was utilized primarily for religious 'hereti~ 
whose consc_iences could not be reformed. The legally authorized ·dispositions:fQr .pon.:. 
capital offenses, primarily corporal punishment and a system of fines, 'vere design(fd for 
an identifiable group .that was vjewed as capable of sufficient reform to" r~t)ll'Il to· the 
society.Id. • 
During the revolutionary era, soCiety's attitude about. the function of the cr.iminal law 
changed. While formerly the criminal law was viewed as a means of preserving religious 
morality, its puipose grew to include the protection of property on non-religious grounds. 
With the development of different attitudes towards crime, the legal system increasingly, 
treated the offender as an outcast of society. Newer forms of dispositions'"gradually: de-
veloped to replace the two revolutionary dispositions-corporal punishment and. rlib11e-
'tao/ fines. Imprisonment at hard labor became the basic form· of disposition· fQchon-: 
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ment, although not now widely used, may be viewed as permissible under 
the eighth amendment if legislatively authorized.21 The constitutional 
amendment, therefore, performs its proper function by exercising a re-
straining influence upon the legislature which authorizes dispositions.22 
An alternative analysis of the eighth amendment gives it a modern 
function in light of the two themes in the history of American punish-
ment. Under this analysis, for example, a legislatively authorized death 
penalty would be impermissible even though death, like corporal punish-
ment, was utilized widely as the disposition for convictions of certain 
crimes at the time of the Founding Fathers. The "in light of con-
temporary human knowledge" 23 and "the dignity of man" 24 standards 
could be utilized by the judiciary to declare the legislatively authorized 
penalty unconstitutional,25 
A majority of the Justices could not agree upon any particular func-
tional analysis of the eighth and fourteenth amendments in the recent 
death penalty case.26 Nonetheless, recent prevailing opinions will have 
two important effects upon decision making in the area of dispositions. 
They establish that the judiciary has the institutional capacity to declare 
a legislatively authorized disposition illegal.27 Furthermore, the per curiam 
opinion of the Furman majority opens up a legal debate over dispositions 
generally and the punishment of death in particular.28 That debate will 
capital offenses by 1805. With state incarceration as the ultimate disposition, procedural 
protections for the individual became more important as the infliction of incarceration 
involved a process of the state versus the individual. Nelson, Emerging Notions of Mod-
ern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.UL. 
REv. 450,451,458-66 (1967). 
21 State v. Cannon, 55 Del. 587, 190 A.2d 514 (1963); accord, Foote v. Maryland, 59 
Md. 264 (1883) (disposition of seven lashes as well as a short jail term upheld where 
statute allowed trial judge to determine the number of lashes); Gracia v. New Mexico, 
1 NM. 415 (1869) (disposition of 30 lashes for horse theft upheld). 
22 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 397, 399-400, 403-04, 426, 429-30, 466~8 (1972) 
(Burger, C.J ., Powell, & Rehnquist, JJ ., dissenting). 
23 Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
24 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
25People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 647, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 164-65 
(1972); see Goldberg & Dersh<>witz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncunstitutional, 83 
HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1777-98 (1970). But see Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 
77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1073-74, 1078 (1964); Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited 
Punishment After Furman v. Georgia (pt. IT), 25 STAN, L. REv. 62, 66 (1972). 
26 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
27 See id. at 239-40; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-67 (1962). Robimon was 
only a substantive limitation on the promulgation of rules describing illegal conduct; 
in the sense of this article, this is a limitation on the adjudicatory stage. See Goldberg & 
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV, L. REv. 1773, 1801 
n.123 (1970). But see In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963). 
28 The highest courts of Delaware and North Carolina recendy h~ve held that Fumum 
requires that the "mercy statutes" permitting the jury or the trial judge not to impose 
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involve a two-fold inquiry: (1) for crimes in general, what are the per-
missible dispositional policies and the permissible means of decision mak-
ing to implement those policies;29 and (2) for what purposes and ac-
cording to what standards can the administrators of dispositional process-
es change the terms and conditions of an individual's confinement? 5° 
AN "INTEREST ANALYSIS" OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
An analysis of the particular interests the criminal law is intended ro 
promote is the first step in the development of standards for disposition. 
The four broad categories of interests or values of the society promoted 
by the criminal law are security of the person's body, private property, 
state processes, and a concept of individualliberty.31 
Whether the fourth interest, a concept of individual liberty, is or ought 
to be a goal of the criminal law has sparked considerable debate.32 It is 
given equal weight here since its conceptualization as a goal serves to 
integrate the substance and process of modem criminal law. Judicially 
the death penalty for capital offenses are invalid. These decisions impose a mandatory 
death penalty scheme by judicial interpretation in both states. See State v. Dickerson, 
- Del. -, -, 298 A.2d 761, 764, 768 (1972); State v. Talbert, - N.C. -, -, 194 
S.E.2d 822, 826 (1973); State v. Wadell,- N.C.-,-, 194 S.E. 2d 19, 28-29 (1972). 
29 See State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 82-83, 270 A.2d 1, 5 (1970) (first offenders in mari-
juana possession cases should receive suspended sentences); Bonnie & Whitebread, The 
Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of 
American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1138-39 (1970); notes 60-86 infra 
and accompanying text; cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 248 (1971) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). See also In re Lynch, S Cal. 3d 410, 503 P .2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); 
People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v. Sinclair, 387 
Mich. 91, 134, 194 N.W.2d 878, 928 (1972) (Brennan, ]., concurring). 
80 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (infliction of whlpping by in-
mate-foreman under court ordered regulations and procedures held violative of eighth 
amendment); In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1889) (court used attachment for con-
tempt to prevent jailkeeper from disciplining detainee by chaining him to the grating 
of his cell on a diet of bread and water because the jailkeeper lacked power to select 
arbitrarily any punishment to discipline detainees). See generally Wheeler, Toward a 
Theory of Limited Ptmislmzent: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. 
L. REv. 838 (1972); Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and U7lUSUal Pwzish-
ments: Judiciary-Enforcement Reform of Non-Federal Penal Imtitutiom, 23 HAsT. L.J. 
lll1 (1972). 
31 At least the first three proposed interests have been discussed elsewhere. See Kadish, 
The Crisis of Over-Criminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967). · 
32 See H. PACKER 14-16. Professor Packer recognizes that a concept of individual liberty 
or autonomy ought to qualify the interest of the criminal law in crime prevention, but 
he does nor place individual liberty on an "equal footing with the prevention of crime •.. 
the primary purpose of the criminal law." Id. at 14. 
One of Packer's most outspoken antagonists suggests that individual autonomy or the 
minimizing of state interference with an individual's life ought to be viewed as one of 
the primary goals of criminal law. Griffith, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third 
"Model'' of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 367 n.34, 374-75 (1970}. · 
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fashioned 'due process limitations are essentially new ways in which in-
dividuals within the criminal process can force the legal system to con-
sider certain challenges to the legality of state control. 33 Prior to the 
criminal law's "constitutionalization," the broad principle of legality was 
the only doctrine which recognized these interests.34 The inclusion of 
a concept of individual liberty as a factor of equal weight in the analysis 
merely recognizes the need to articulate those characteristics or interests 
of individuals that should be factors in criminal law decision making. 
· This concept of individual liberty as an interest to be considered at 
dispositions is not synonymous with freedom from governmental inter-
ference.35 As a factor of analysis at disposition, the concept of individual 
liberty refers only to limitations on the state's interference with indi-
viduals adjudged "criminal" to the extent necessary to achieve the state's 
qispositional goals. As an independent factor, the concept of individual 
liberty is, in addition, a starting point for rules of disposition where the 
g<?als. sought in the promulgation of certain laws and the adjudication 
of cen~ conduct as criminal are in doubt. 
FOUR AREAS OF APPELLATE COURT RULE MAKING FOR 
TRIAL JUDGE SENTENCING 
:With an interest analysis as· a to'ol for the development of rules of dis-
position, an appellate court is ready to assume its often advoc~ted role 
as reviewer of trial judge l)entencing decisions. The rules developed 
shoul~ be capable of justifying the differing treatment of individuals by 
the legal system36 by refere:t;~.ce to.the dispositional goals of that system.87 
Four problem areas of trial judge sentencing are ripe for appellate 
~?~t resolution through primary rule making under the analysis pro-
posed. !he decision to grant or deny probation in a given case should 
be viewed and resolved by the appellate court as the question of incar-
ceration versus non-incarceration. The proper use of prior convictions in 
'f!,iaLjudge_ sentencing is badly in need of appellate court guidance. Ap-
:33 See H. PACKER 163-73. 
34 ]. HALL, GENE~ PruNCIP~ OF CruMINAL LAW 27-69 (2d cd. 1960); G. WILLIAMS, 
CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART 575-608 (London ed. 1961). 
'35 H, h~wever, the question is whethe~ th~ concept of liberty prohibits the state from 
using· the criminal process, the concept of liberty appropriately might be defined as free-
dom from governmental interference. See Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Re-
visited: A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process", 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 490 
(1971); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) • 
. ?6 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 
86+65 (1963). ' 
· ai&e·Cobuni, Disparity in Sentences' and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RutGERS 
L. REv. 207, 208:09. (1971). ·' 
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pellate courts should develop rul~ fo! the disposition of individuals found 
guilty of more than one offense,- since. legislative guidelines or standards 
for dispositions in such cases have te'n~ed to ignore· the functioning of 
the criminal law as a coherent process. Finally, appellate courts should 
develop criteria ·to determine the proper effect of an individual's non-
cooperation with the processes ·of the. crimirial law. Once the primary 
rules of dispositions are promulgated by the appellate court, the penal 
policy appropriate to achieve the dispositional-goal can be formulated. 
Incarceration v. Non-incarceration. The grant or denial of pro-
bation, or· of any other permissible disposition not involving incarcera-
tion, and· the disparity of disposif!ons- between two individuals found 
guilty of the same offense, particularly where one receives probation and 
the other is incarcerated, have long been recognized as problems most in 
need of the guidance of appellate court rules. On the assumption that 
minimizing' governmental interferen;ce is qne of the goals sought in th~ 
development of rules for dispositions, indivipuals should be presumed to 
prefer probation over incarceration. 38 The legal standards that govelJl 
this primary decision justify why certain individuals are incarcerat~d 
while others receive probation. 
The shift from the prevailing analysis to· the proposed one as a means 
of deciding who should be granted probation involves three steps. First, 
the criteria suggested as a guide to. the trial judge's grant or denial of 
probation must be tested against modern concepts of individual liberty. 
The second step involves a determination of the proper scope of the ap-
pellate judiciary's policy making rol_e iri disposition, a role generally 
ignored under the existing analysis. Finally, dispositional decisions should 
be cast in terms of overall dispositional policy so that appellate opinions 
in sentencing cases will contain principles of law, which can be used as 
authority in deciding future cases by appellate and trial courts alike. 
The recent codification movement in the United States has produced 
some suggested criteria for trial judge sentencing in the American Law 
Institute's Model Penal Code.39 rn.· addition to enacting a general pre-
sumption against incarceration, the Model Penal Code provides for 11 
different types of factors that should b~ ~eighed by the trial judge in 
as Some individuals convicted of crimes in fact may prefer incarceration, but their 
reasons should be· considered pathological arid shoUld not affect the adoption of particu-
lar legal standards. 
39 ALI MonEr. PENAL ·conE § 7.01 (1962);• see Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law 
in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 C<iLuM:. L. REv. 1425, 1450-=56 (1968); 
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 465 
(1961). . : ·'; .. 
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Pis determination to grant or deny probation.40 Those recommended 
criteria are a product of the prevailing analysis, and an examination of 
one of the factors for sentencing demonstrates that the criteria probably 
are unworkable as there is no overall framework for legal decision mak-
ing included in the Code. 
Section 7.01(2) (f) of the Model Penal Code provides that the judge 
should consider whether the defendant has compensated or will compen-
sate the victim of his crimes.41 This criterion is likely to be significant 
if used by trial judges in cases involving the variety of crimes that 
threaten private property. If willingness to reimburse assumes an ability 
to reimburse, the inappropriateness of the criterion can be demonstrated 
by comparing its effects upon two individuals. Assume that both indi-
viduals have been convicted of one of the offenses against private proper-
ty and that one of them, A, is willing and able to reimburse the victim, 
but the other, B, is willing but unable to reimburse the victim. 
Without any other information about A or B, the use of section 
7.01 (2)(f) as a standard probably increases B's risk of incarceration as 
compared to A because of their respective economic situations. Viewing 
E's crime as one against private property, his greater risk of incarceration 
40 The Code provides in pertinent parts: 
(2) The f.ollowing grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the 
Court, shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of im-
prisonment: 
(a) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened seri-
ous harm; 
(b) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would 
cause or threaten serious harm; 
{c) the defendant acted under a strong provocation; 
(d) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the de-
fendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense; 
(e) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated 
its commission; 
(f) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his 
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he has sustained; 
(g) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activ-
ity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the 
.commission of the present crime; 
(h) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances 
unlikely to recur; 
(i) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is un-
likely to commit another crime; 
(j) the defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to proba-
tionary treatment; 
(k) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship 
to himself or his dependents. 
ALI MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 7.01 (1962). 
4.1 See id. § 7.01 (2} (f); note 40 supra. 
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can be justified if the dispositional goal is to keep individuals with fewer 
economic resources from taking from those with greater resources in an 
unlawful manner. A is allowed to decrease his risk of incarceration by 
reimbursement on the more general theory that offenses against private 
property are concerned primarily with misappropriation of resources, 
so that reallocation through reimbursement 'Of the victim by the offender 
furthers .this broad interest sought by the criminal law through disposi-
tional policy. 
Equalizing the risk of incarceration of A and B by disallowing section 
7.01 (2) (f) as a factor in trial judge sentencing could be justified by a 
different theory of the goals behind laws that protect the interest in 
private property. The proliferation of offenses in this category is in 
response to a recognition by the criminal law that individuals in a society 
originally built upon a concept of private wealth are tempted to allocate 
the resources of others to themselves.42 If this explanation is accurate, 
the goal at disposition should be to promote among all individuals, re-
gardless of their economic resources, the notion that there are illegitimate 
means of utilizing the resources of others. When illegitimate means are 
chosen, the society will intervene thr'Ough the criminal process against 
the individual who is in effect an illegitimate entrepreneur.43 
. Equalization of the risk of incarceration of A and B is the proper 
aispositional policy in modern American criminal law. The law's policy 
that an individual's economic status should not adversely affect the ad-
judication of his criminality must be viewed as within the concept of 
individual liberty at disposition.44 Under this analysis, the appellate coun 
would rule that the use of willingness to pay as a factor in the trial judge's 
determination concerning probation is impermissible in offenses against 
private property. The court's rationale would be that the use of the 
standard violated the concept of individual liberty since its use increases 
risk of incarceration on the basis of economic status. In a case involving 
an individual in B's position, even without a person like A as a co-de-
fendant, the court could make the ruling as a matter of dispositional 
policy without having to determine what the proper criteria for granting 
probation in the particular case should be. 
· 42 The recognition of the traditional "claim o£ right" defense in most common law 
crimes involving theft might be justified on this theory. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246 (1952); Hart, supra note 16, at 431 n.70. 
43 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Iwliewbility: Orze 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972). 
44See Morgan v. Wolford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973) (requirement of restitution 
as a condition of probation justiciable on equal protection grounds); q. Tate v. Short, 
399 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illjnois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
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Where appellate courts do rule that probation is to be granted, the 
reasoning employed should.establish standards that are appropriate guides 
for trial judge decisions in future cases and consistent with the appellate 
court's broad rule making power. For example, sentencing decisions in 
selective service cases at both the appellate and trial court levels raise 
troublesome questions of the proper exercise of trial judge and appellate 
court discretion in dispositional decisions.45 
The reasoning in the recent case of United States v. Daniels46 demon-
Strates the need for principled decision making by appellate courts. The 
defendant, a conscientious objector, failed to comply with an order of 
his local board to report for instructions to commence his alternative 
service. The appellate court previously had remanded the case for a nevv. 
sentence upon affirming Daniels' conviction for violating the selective 
service law.47 Upon remand the district judge once again sentenced 
Daniels to the five year maximum term. On the second appeal the court 
relied upon what it viewed as Daniels' individual characteristics in en-
tering a probation order in its mandate to the district judge.48 
The appellate court's order, however, went beyond merely mandating 
probation and the term of probation. Daniels was a Jehovah's Witness 
who apparently was willing to comply with a judicial order to present 
himself for civilian work but not an order from his selective service 
board. The appellate court's order accommodated Daniels' individual 
religious scruples against cooperating with the selective service system 
by requiring him to perform civilian work determined by the probation 
department.49 
While the five year maximum sentence may have been excessive in 
Daniels' case, the important question not addressed by the court was 
whether any period of incarceration was appropriate for the offense. If 
the interest protected by the substantive offense is the state processes, 
particularly the process of selecting those individuals who must do com-
batant service, civilian service, or no service,S0 it is difficult to under~ 
stand why the court utilized its powers and resources to put Daniels 
into the civilian service slot when another specialized state agency was 
authorized to and had already done the same thing. Daniels' individual 
45 See FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 108 n.32; cf. Note, Sentencing in Cases of Civil Dis-
obedience, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1508 (1968). 
46446 F.2d 967 (6th C'rr.1971). 
47 United States v. Daniels, 429 F.2d J273 (6th. Cir. 1970). , 
.. 48446 F.2d at 972. Such action by the appellate court rather than remanding has been 
characterized as unprecedented in commentaries on the case. See 23 CASE W. REs. L, REv. 
430 (1972); 42 U. CrN. L. REv. 195 (1972): 
49 446 F .2d at 972. 
50 Cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
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religious beliefs had been considered when he was classified as a consci-
~ntious objector by the selective service board. The legislatively-pre-
scribed duty for a conscientious objector was to perform civilian work 
.as ordered by the local board, and failure to comply with that order 
results in criminal liability. The apparent explanation for the court's 
.action was that Daniels' religious beliefs justified this highly individual.: 
ized treatment. Such an explanation ignores the difficult type of fact 
:finding trial judges might be encouraged to make if religious belief is 
to be a factor for distinguishing the disposition of ip.dividuals. 51 
The appellate court stated that Daniels' sole motivation for refusing 
to obey the order was his religious belief, 52 but the court failed to con-
sider whether individual motivation is a relevant criterion to guide the 
primary stage of disposition-the decision concerning incarceration-or 
whether motivation for disobeying the order is relevant in adjudicating 
the criminality of Daniels' conduct. If religious motivation is the con-
trolling factual element, the individual whose motivation is found by the 
sentencing judge to be simple contrariness could be sentenced to .five 
years. 
Furthermore, while the total -legal system protects the individual's 
religious beliefs under the .first amendment, serious questions arise as to 
the proper function of criminal law and the fairness of its administration 
when religious beliefs are us~d to justify what otherwise would be viewed 
as criminal conduct. It is no defense to a charge of bigamy, for instance, 
that the individual's religion permits or promotes polygamy.53 When-
ever the law attempts to exempt certain individuals from the criminal 
law, as in the case of peyote use by certain American Indian religion~ 
~ects, the question arises as to why newer "religious" groups cannot 
daim the exemption from criminal sanctions for use of different drugs 
for allegedly religious purposes. 54 · _ · 
If violation of the order of a local selective service board is viewed 
as a crime against state processes, the proper issue in Daniels is whethe~ 
~~e sole .objective in. having suclJ. a crime is to encourage individuals in 
general to cooperate with a state regulatory process of fairly selecting 
mdividuals for state qpligatiqns. Assuming that .protection of the $ystem 
of selection is the proper .legislative goal in defining the conduct ~ 
· 51 Whether the legislature sho.Jlld consider broadening th~ category of inquiry into an 
individual's belief is a separate question. Cf. Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 
77 YALE L. J. 1053, 1068-69 (1968). 
'52#6 F.2d at 968:' · ' 
53 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
54See generally Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851· (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other 
grouruls, .395 U.S: 6 ·(1969); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. id 716! 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. REfr· 
<69 (1964). . ,. ', : ' . . 
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criminal, 55 the issue is whether that goal can be furthered at disposition 
by the imposition of some period of incarceration. Without deciding 
whether the maximum penalty was excessive by some appropriate prin-
ciple, 56 the decision concerning incarceration should not turn solely on 
what the court views as an individual's religious principles. To be fair 
to the individual who violates the law without religious motivations or 
any other apparent motivation, the legal system should minimize its in-
quiry into religious beliefs. 57 
The technique applied by the Daniels court of categorizing the indi-
vidual ·offenders to arrive at broad dispositional policy is a practical re-
sult of the prevailing analysis' stated goal of individualizing sentencing 
decisions.58 Such an analysis, however, will not bring about the desired 
result of principled decision making in sentencing. An appellate court 
using such an analysis has decided that gambling offenders ordinarily 
should be incarcerated,59 but that first time offenders convicted of pos-
session of marijuana should receive probation. 60 The court was able to 
reach the latter result without any explicit consideration of its previous 
holding as to gambling offenses or any attempt to reconcile the results 
in terms of overall dispositional policy. 61 
66 Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377-80 (1968). 
56 See Note, supra note 45, at 1511-14. 
67 See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1969); note 51 supra. 
68 A recent study of the appellate process of sentencing in England indicates that the 
growing acceptance of individualization of disposition did not mean the end of sentences 
of incarceration. The framework of sentencing policy developed by the English Ap-
pellate Court of Criminal Appeal allows two primary modes of disposition-individualiza-
tion or incarceration. Under this analysis individualization includes dispositions which 
include confinement in state institutions either f.or training or preventive custody of 
certain supposedly identifiable groups of individuals. The analysis demonstrates that 
there are four types of individuals for whom individualized dispositions are appropriate: 
young offenders, indetenninate recidivists, inadequate recidivists, and mentally disordered 
offenders. 
This notion of individualization assumes that the goal of the legal system in these 
cases is treatment or reformation of individuals so disposed. D. THoMAs, PRINCIPLES oF 
SENTENCING 3-31 (1970). However, when the goal of disposition is non-criminal, the 
practice in the United States has been to use "civil" commitment procedures. These dis-
positional processes must include principles that protect individuals from confinement. 
These civil dispositional processes have been affected in the United States by the due 
process revolution. See notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text. 
59 State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 162 A.2d 851 (1960). 
so State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970); see [1966] New Jersey Laws ch. 313, 
§ 24: 18-47 (c) (1) (1966). 
61 The court in State v. Ward did state, however, that it considered its determination 
to suspend sentences to be consistent with a legislative policy of leniency toward first 
offenders. See 57 N.J. at 82-83, 270 A.2d at 5-6. 
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Under the proposed model, any distinction between the dispositional 
policies for gambling and drug offenses62 in terms of the four broad in-
terests promoted by the criminal law63 would be inappropriate. Both 
offenses are "vice crimes" and should be analysed in terms of the fourth 
interest of a concept of individual liberty, since neither of the Qffenses 
fits within the first three interests. To develop a policy of disposition in 
terms of a concept of liberty is to define the meaning of "individuality" 
for the purpose of legal decision making. Such a definition begins with 
a comparison of the various attitudes towards the offending conduct.64 
Drug users and gamblers probably would define individual liberty to 
mean freedom from governmental interference. 55 From their perspective, 
the criminal law should not be employed to regulate the specific conduct 
in question. The proposed analysis, however, cannot ignore the effect 
on non-gamblers and non-drug users of having criminal laws prohibiting 
the conduct. Assuming the latter groups are in the majority, the use of 
the criminal law to prohibit the conduct could be viewed as beneficial 
to the society's concept of individual liberty. A particular notion of in-
dividual physical and mental health-that the free man is unshackled by 
the vices of gambling or drugs-is promoted by discouraging the con-
duct. If drug users or gamblers are becoming at least a substantial mi-
nority, then a wide divergence of views as to the meaning of individual-
ity exists within the society. 66 
The majority is presumed to share with the minority a desire to be 
free from unnecessary governmental interference. The use of the law's 
most coercive form Qf social control, however, allows the majority to 
use the criminal law and its disposition to impose its view of individuality 
on a substantial minority. None of the other three social int~rests sought 
through the criminal law-security of the body, private property and 
state processes-is at stake. Thus an appellate court could conclude that 
the promulgation of the prohibition and the adjudication of the conduct 
62 The discussion will concern only the criminal offense concerning marijuana. Other 
types o£ drugs such as heroin present other dispositional problems. Cf. In re De La 0, 
59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1963) (challenge to civil commitment of 
individuals addicted to heroin). 
63 See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
64 The use of such a comparison to develop a legal mle is a form of utilitarian analysis. 
See Packer, supra note 35, at 496. 
65See generally State v. Kantner, - Hawaii-, 493 P. 2d 306 (1972); Bonnie & 
Whitebread, supra note 29; Packer, supra note 35. 
66 The present analysis does not decide whether the legal system could establish a 
system of control or regulation over certain types of drugs and gambling. Nor does 
the present legal analysis require a decision as to what forms of taxation on the use 
of drugs and gambling may be legally permissible were drugs and gambling to be de-
criminalized. Cf. H. PACKER 332-42. 
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as crimin~l probably have an adverse effect upon the .society's concept 
of individual liberty and that incarceration therefore is inappropriate. 67 
The appellate court rule requiring that probation -ordinarily should be 
imposed in both gambling and drug offenses is established in the interest 
of minimizing governmental interference with individuals. 68 The rule 
is furthermore a frank acknowledgment by the judiciary that the utility 
Of the criminal law as means of regulating these forms of conduct is in 
doubt. As a more generalized principle of disposition, the standard should 
be that when~ the social control goal is in doubt under the interest an-
alysis, decision making is weighted in favor of promoting a concept of 
individual liberty. 
Yet the trial judges specifically were instructed by the appellate court 
to impo~e custodial sentences in gambling offenses.69 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court went even further in the interest of minimizing disparity 
and instructed that a single judge in each district should sentence gam-
bling offenders.70 The justification for imposing custodial dispositions 
for a bookmaking offense was that the goal was to cope effectively with 
organized crime. As -one court stated, " [ w] hen the offense serves the 
interests of a widespread conspiracy, it would be a mistake to think of 
the defendant as an isolated figure." 71 Even if the appellate court is 
strongly of the persuasion that organized crime exists, the result of the 
court's dispositional rule is to allow the sentencing judge to engage in 
impermissible adjudication. At sentencing the trial judge is allo\~ed to 
treat ·the individual as if the legal system in fact had adjudicated him 
guilty of a conspiracy-a group crime. In fact, in the case where the 
court established the rule of custodial offenses, everything that the sen-
tencing judge knew about the defendant's criminal activity came from 
a· pre-sentence report since the defendant had been allowed to plea no 
contest or non vult.72 One implicit purpose of the rule is· to reflect in. the 
defendant's· sentence criminal activity of others.73 To justify the .dis-
.- 67 See gener:ally_ H. HART, LAw, LmERTY ANn Mo~LITY (1963) • 
.". 68While ~~ction 7.01(b)(l) of the Model Penal Code suggests that whether conduct 
~aused serious harm. is relevant to the decision not to incarceJ;ate, the present interest 
analysis arrives at the same result by determining that the social goal to be promoted 
by criminalization is questionable. The concept of individual liberty is considered to 
determine. the degree o£ "harm." .. 
69 See note 59 sdpra and accompanying teXt. 
70 See State V.~De Stasio, 49 N.J.-247, 25'4-55, 229 A.2d·636, 640 (1967). 
71 State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 202, 162 A.2d 851, 854 (196,0). 
7ZSee id; at'198, 162 A.2d at 852. Whether individuals should be required to plead not 
guilty s-6 .that the legal system would have in all cases of disposition some type of 
adjudiCation or· fact finding proceSs· raises a host of other legal issues .. Cf. United States 
v. JackSon, 390 U.S •. 570 (1968). . ·· . · · 
73 See State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 254-55,229 A.2d 63(), 640 (1967). •. 
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positional policy· on the grounds that the custodial sentence will force 
individual defendants to come forward with information about their 
supposed superiors raises a further issue of whether the mdividual right 
of non-cooperation has been infringed.74 
· Perhaps the functional mistake in the court's analysis is the use of rul~ 
of disposition to achieve the investigative goals of other state officials. 
When the argument was made to the court that the custodial se~tence 
was not necessary "because the public wants to gamble," 75 ~he court 
could have developed a dispositional policy in accorda:n~~ with an .in-
terest analysis so that individuals need not suffer incar~eration for pro-
viding a gambling service that members of the public apparently desire. 
If gambling is a criminal offense because "it wrecks homes ~nd destroys 
men" and because it "spawns embezzlement, larceny and crimes of vio:-
lence," 76 the question remains why the legislature in the state has legal-
ized gambling in some instances. 77 The existence of a vice crime in fact 
may increase the power of the syndicate,78 and the actual total impact 
upon the legal system can be viewed as another disutility of the offense. 
While investigation of criminal activity is a legitimate state function in 
criminal law, the use of the dispositional rule to achieve ,tpis p':Jrpose is 
at the very least questionable. · 
In selecting a dispositional policy for the first time marijuana offender, 
the court rightly refused to tallow what the interest a,nalysi~ suggests 
is a wrongly decided precedent in the gambling case, but ~i'd, so without 
explanation. Rather, the court distinguished the cases, but the distinc-
tions did not justify the difference in dispositions employed. Since the 
actual defendant in the case had admitted smoking marijuana, the first 
time offender status may have been a result 'Of th~ fact that this was the 
firs~ time that he had been apprehended.79 Nonetheless, the court stated 
"still there is no suggestion that the defendant was a seller or induc;:er." ~0 
The last sentence, assuming some notion of principled decision making, 
·might suggest the rule that a seller of marijuana might be incarce:J;"ated. 
But in two subsequent decisions, the lower appellate court remanded 'the 
cases for resentencing where the defendants had been convicted of sell-
74 See notes 1387 156 infra and accompanying text. \: J 
75 State v. DeGeorge, 113 N.J. Super. 542, 544, 274 A.2d 593, 594 (App. Div. 1971). 
76 33 N.J. at 202, 162 A.2d at 854. 
77 See. N.J: STAT •• ANN. §§ 5:8-1 to -130, 5:9-1 to -25 (1973) (establisliing New ~ersey 
state lottery). · · · 
78,H. PACKER 347-54. 
79 See 57 N.J. at 81, i70 A.2d at: 4.· 
sold. at 82, 270 A.2d at 5. I'. 
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~g small amounts of marijuana.81 Even though sale of drugs is a dif-
ferent offense, the court suggested that the "non-commercial" seller 
should receive probation. The suggestion that the non-commercial seller 
is somehow less culpable than the economically successful dealer is based 
on assumptions about the drug culture which have little sociological 
·validity and less factual support . 
. The courts' articulated goal of rehabilitation for possessors and some 
·sellers of drugs obscures the consequences of its rulings. Without any 
consideration by the court of the actual capability of the probation 
service to reform drug users as opposed to gamblers, the court allows 
an anomaly to exist. This anomaly exists because the prevailing analysis 
does not provide for explicit precedential decision making by appellate 
courts in sentencing. The idea that the gambling case might contain a 
·principle of decision making that should or should not be extended to 
other cases probably would not occur to an appellate court operating 
under the present method of analysis. 
The proposed analysis, without pretending to be exhaustive at this 
juncture, has established two primary rules to be developed by appellate 
courts to guide trial judge determination of probation. First, where the 
interest promoted by the substantive offense is in doubt, trial judges 
should be told to grant probation82 unless some secondary rule would 
require some period of incarceration. Secondly, in offenses against state 
processes such as selective service offenses and wilful evasion of federal 
income tax, 83 the trial judge should be told by the appellate courts to 
refuse probation unless some secondary rule would require probation. 
The apparent penal policy underlying such a rule of incarceration is the 
deterrence of others.84 Exceptions to either rule, if any, should be drawn 
narrowly. Secondary rules for any offense where the primary rule is 
incarceration or non-incarceration might involve factors of mitigation or 
.aggravation.85 To the degree that the particular explicit policy of in-
81 State v. Breenan, 115 N.1. Super. 400, 279 A.2d 900 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Den-
nery, No. A-1446-69 (N.J. App. Div. July 16, 1971). See generally 3 RUTGERS L.J. 370 
(1971). 
82Non-incarceration or probation as conditional liberty is still a state process of con-
trol'that may be challenged by the individual. Cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 41 U.SL.W. 
4647 (U.S. May 14; 1973). The development of decisional rules to define roles for pro-
bation officers and lawyers or to exercise legal control over them awaits further de-
velopment. For a discussion of rules of. decisions for a process of conditional liberty 
see notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text. 
.. 83 See United States v. Whitfield, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. 
Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Mo. 1939). 
84 Solomon, Sentences in Selective Service and lncume Tax Cases, 52 F.RD. 481, 484 
(1970). See generally ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES oN DEiERRENCE (1971). 
85 See notes 87-110 infra and accompanying text. 
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carceration or non-incarceration enraged the public, the legislature might 
be moved to reconsider the appropriateness of the substantive offenses 
as well as the policy of disposition.86 
The Consequences of Prior Adjudication of Criminality. Ap-
pellate courts which do review sentences have used evidence that a con-
victed individual previously has been convicted of an offense to uphold 
the imposition of long periods of incarceration.87 The justification of-
fered for the use of such data to increase sentences is that convicted m-
dividuals with prior convictions pose a greater danger to society than 
convicted individuals without prior convictions. The inadequacy of the 
present approach to the use of prior convictions in sentencing will be 
demonstrated under the proposed analysis by a redefinition of the issues 
for appellate decision making and through the development of policies 
and rules to replace the existing approach. · 
Under the due process model of the criminal law developed by Pro-
fessor Herbert Packer in The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 58 the two 
values reinforcing the legality of the guilt determination and thus the 
legitimacy of state control over an individual are a fair trial with counsel 
and appellate review. 89 Those Supreme Court 'Opinions that appear to 
implement these two values at sentencing are actually analyses deai.ing 
with constitutional limitations on adjudication. An interest analysis, how-
ever, may be used to develop rules for the use of prior convictions iri 
sentencing to implement these values in the context of dispositions. Re-
cent pronouncements by the Supreme Court have altered the constitu-
tional framework for reviewing the legality of the use of prior convic-
tions in sentencing without offering a guide to proper sentencing policy 
when prior convictions are involved. 
In North Carolina v. Pearce90 the Court dealt with the effect of sen-
tencing practices on the unrestrained utilization of the appellate process 
86 The argument that the judiciary should await legislative responses to the dysfunc-
tional state of the law of criminal dispositions is based on the assumption that legislatures 
will respond rationally to the core problems. However, if recent responses of educated 
and well informed members of the public and the legal profession to problems of the 
criminal law are indicative o£ popular response to crime, the assumption is unwar-
ranted. See generally Lehman, Crime, the Public and the Crime Cummission: .A Critical 
Review of The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MrCH. L. REv. 1487 (i968). 
87 See People v. Jackson, 95 ill. App. 2d 193, 228 N.E.2d 196 (1968). Where the evi-
dence of prior convictions is unreliable, its use is subject to attack on constitutional 
grounds. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Baker v. United States, 388 
F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Myers, 374 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1967). 
BBSee H. PACKER 149-73. 
89Jd. at 229-38. 
90 395 u.s. 711 (1969). 
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Qy con,.v.ict~d person~. Th~ Court assumed that a conv.icted defendant 
would \Je, deterred from taking an appeal if, .having won a retrial, he not 
only might be reconvicted but also might be given a longer sentence 
without explanation of the grounds for the increased term. In Pearce, 
therefore, the. ,Court held that a successful appellant who is convicted 
on retrial· may not be given a greater sentence than he originally re-
ceive.d.unless,the trial judge can justify his action.91 Then the sentence 
may .. be increased if the trial judge bases it on "identifiable new con-
duct." 92 
Some ;courts and commentators suggest that Pearce prohibits the trial 
judge from using new or additional evidence about the nature of the 
original offense to justify a harsher punishment upon retrial and recon-
viction.93. If this interpretation of Pearce is adopted by the Supreme 
Court, ~he. Pearce doctrine would seem to mean that a legally proper con-
viction or adjudication authorized the imposition of a sentence that. can-
not be increased except for reasons having nothing to do with the orig-
inal tn)l·process. Apparently, the Pearce doctrine primarily is concerned 
with protecting the value of appellate review of a 'criminal conviction, 
as opposed to' adjudication in the broad sense used in this article, siri.ce a 
harsher sentence can be imposed by a trial judge after a trial de novo94 
or by a jury.95 As long as the individual has counsel who could invoke 
the appellate process, the Court will permit the harsher sentence follow-
ing a trial de novo- to stand.9G 
In Tucker, v., United States,97 the Court, reflecting Packer's second 
value of a fait trial with counsel, held that a sentencing judge should 
not consider a· prior conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wain-
wright._98 Thus,-. the Court arguably altered the constitutional frame-
work for determining the legality of the use of prior convictions. The 
most'important aspect of Tucker is the Court's willingness to develop a 
91 1a. at 1is-i6. 
• 92 Id: at 726. 
93 Peoplcr ·v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 94-96, 191 N.W .2d 375, 379-81 (1971) 1 rev'd 01l other 
grounds, 41 U.SL.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973); Alpin, Sentence Increases On Retrial 
After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CIN. L. REv.427, 444 (1970). 
· 94 Colten v .. Ken~cky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Alpin, supra note 93, at 455-59, 
95Ch~n v .. Stynchcombe, 41 U.SL.W. 4662 (U.S. May 21, 1973). 
' 96 Whether, a~ individual can be retried with counsel solely to change a fine or pro-
b.ation .to a j~ sentence under Argersinger v. Hamlin is not discussed. See 407 U.~ •. 25 
(1972).' Some courts, adopting a similar formula to Argersinger for counsel ~n lower 
c:ourts, h~y-e i11dic:ated new trials for the purP.oses of imprisonment are appropria.te. See 
Rodriquez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216 (1971). But a determinatio~ of t})at 
issue shouid also depend· upon an interpretation of the meaning of Gideon for sen-
tencing. · ' , · ·• : 
97 404 u.s. 443 (1972). . . . .. :" 
98 I d. at 448~9; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). ' . ,., 
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dpctrine at sentencing to. implement the value. of a fair t:Pai: ~his will.,.. 
ingness is particularly dramatic in that the. Court's decision· required. a 
resentencing in .a 20 year old case that had reached the Supreme· Court 
by way of a post-conviction relief petition.99 There is no need. to con-
sider whether the defendant in fact was guilty of the prior conviction 
since under the Court's analysis of Gideon, the prior guilt· determination 
without counsel automatically is infirm.100 The Court, however, fails to 
indicate how an appellate court is to determine whether. the trial judget 
in. sentencing or resenten,cing, has used the infirm prior conviction to 
enhance punishment in viohition of the Tucker rules. One possible resolu:... 
tion of this issue is to develop a standard similar to the Courfs doctriri.e 
governing the jury's consideration of prior convictions ~btained in vio'-
lation of Gideon in making its determination of guilt.101 Tlie Court could 
as'sume that a .sentencing··judge, like an adjudicating jury, may place un~ 
due emphasis :on the evidence of prior convictions. In th~ case of· a 
tainted jury verdict, however; the defendant is. entitled t~. ~ ne:w trial by 
a ·new jury where the infirm prior convictions cannot.be)agrilltted .. With 
a sentencing. judge no . such . easy solution iS available; 'Vthough. some 
courts have assumed that Tucker requires limited disclosure· to defens-e 
couns~l of prior convictions contained in presentenc~ reports,102 ·ap.:.. 
parently on the theory that counsel then will be able to determine if any 
of the prior convictions had been obtained in violation 'of Gideon.103 .. 
Were the implementation of the Tucker rule to ·reacli the -Su:prem~ 
Col,lrt, the Court might be tempted t6 experiment with trties about dis-
closure of presentence· reports· or use the technique of preSumptions· of 
individual response to'triai.judge sentencing behavior as it ·(lid:in Pearc~. 
A'better approach to the issue·would be for the Court to lookat~Tucker 
and Pearce together in order to hegin the tentative outline of a theory 
of due process for sentencin&"· The Court could see t~at the t:Wo ·cases~ 
99Jd. at 445. 
100 &:e Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). . ..... 
10iSee Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S.'107, i09 (1967). . . . . ., 
102See United States v. Picard; 464 F.2d 215 (lst.Cir. 1972);,United S~atJ v. Janie~. 
464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.1972). . . ' . ' .. .. 
103 The issue has begun to trouble some courts. One court has ·determin~d that a fed-
eral hearing is not required if the sentencing judge· thinks the original sentence is still 
appropriate. See Lipscomb .v. Clark, 168. F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972). An.oP'!er COll;ft, hold:-
ing that Argersinger_ is not .retroactive, cited as its re~oning the effect· of retro<tctivity 
on parole, probation .and re5entencihg. See Potts v. Superintendent, 2i3' :va. 432; '192 
S.E;2d 780 (1972).· A 'third court has· held that retroactivity of Leary v. ·United States 
itivalidates a: prior convi~tion ~obtamed in. violation of Leary'. The .llivhlia~tioii 'o( ~~ 
prior'' conviction meatit. the conuhitment under the state's habitrial offeiirler·· s\::ii:Ufe \va5 
invalid. Taylor v. United States, 472 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1973); Ex parte Taylor, 484 
S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Grim. App. 1972); see Leary v. United States, 395·.-HS. ·6::(:1.969.):-~ 
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read together, involve the implementation of Professor Packer's two 
values of the due process model. For the purpose of developing rules 
that deal direcdy with the questions of sentencing, the Court should 
treat the two values of fair trial and appellate review as involving one 
value or interest. That value is the form of adjudication in modern crim-
inal law. Under this approach, the defendants in Tucker and Pearce are 
permitted to challenge the legality of their sentences because the basic 
form of the decision making in criminal law is at stake. If the Court is 
willing to define litigable issues at sentencing in terms of previous in-
volvements with criminal adjudication, the Court should determine that 
the individuals within the criminal process have a cognizable interest in 
that form of adjudication. 
To assert that individuals can litigate their prior involvement with the 
criminal law at sentencing is not to formulate a sentencing policy for 
the use of prior convictions. However, by redefining the issue involved 
in the use of prior convictions in terms of prior adjudication, the sen-
tencing policy could be stated as a presumption that punishment may be 
inflicted solely on the basis of the offense for which the individual has 
been convicted in the instant case. That is the only conviction for which 
the sentencing judge can be sure that there has been a proper adjudica-
tion in the broadest sense. Such a dispositional policy could be articu-
lated as a constitutional principle of due process.104 Alternatively, the 
policy could be grounded in an interpretation of the thirteenth amend-
ment. Functionally, the amendment could be read to create such a pre-
sumption by an interpretation of the words "duly convicted." 105 In con-
junction with notions of due process the thirteenth amendment could be 
read to mean that trial judges should not be required to determine 
whether any prior conviction was obtained in conformity with consti-
tutionally required standards. Rather the trial judge should be authorized 
to sentence for the convicted offense as the only one for which the in-
dividual has been "duly convicted." 
The suggestion that trial judges at sentencing cannot assume that in-
dividuals with prior convictions are more dangerous than those without 
prior convictions does not mean that the legal system should not dif-
ferentiate between the two classes of persons. The proposed rule recog-
nizes a distinction between them by allowing first offenders to mitigate 
their sentences. The proposed analysis prohibits the trial judge from in-
creasing sentences on the basis of prior convictions simply as a means 
104See generally Cohen, supra note 10; Kadish, Legal Norm tmd Discretion in the 
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962); Pugh & Carver, mpra note 
10. 
105 See note 19 supra. 
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of questioning the assumption of greater dangerousness. Recidivist sta-
tistics,. while impressive to some public officials, do not prove the as"-
sumption.106 In effect the legal system must make a value determination, 
and the proposed analysis strikes the balance in favor of minimizing the 
amount of state interference. Legislation is required for the legal system 
to be authorized to impose special dispositions for persistent offenders. 
Existing habitual offender statutes may be inadequate as the policy un-
derlying such statutes is not clear.107 The legislatures are limited in the 
types of assumptions they can make concerning the dispositions that 
should .flow from legislatively prohibited conduct.108 More importantly, 
if the legislature wants to mandate dispositions based on assumptions 
about criminal behavior, as trial judges have done, it would be required 
to develop standards for predicting future behavior. This task presents 
difficulty since criminal adjudication in the modern sense generally is 
engaged in a process of determining what events occured in the past.100 
If, however, the legislature were willing to make clear that an habitual 
offender statute exists for the purpose of retribution, the courts would 
then be faced with the issue of whether the policy of retribution is a 
justification for the disposition and accompanying process of decision 
making.110 
Dispositiowl Criteria for Multiple Convictions. The present 
manner of handling the problem of multi-count convictions under a 
single indictment is itself a demonstration of the need for new sentencing 
standards. Development of alternative standards requires a functional 
analysis by the appellate courts. Using such an analysis, the courts first 
should ascertain the legislative purpose in providing for various statutory 
~chemes proscribing similar or related forms of conduct. Second, the 
analysis should generate hypotheses for the existence of a requirement 
of multiple count prosecutions in modern criminal law. Third, an inter-
lOG H. PACKER 46-47. 
107 See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (aggravated 
penalty for second conviction of indecent exposure unconstitutional). Compare Marshall 
v. Parker, 470 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom., Marshall v. United States, 
93 S.Ct. 1429 (1973) with Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
108 See notes 186-225 infra and accompanying text. 
109 Cf., Goldstein & Katz, Dangeroumess and Mental Illness-Some Observatio11S on the 
Decision to Release Perso11S Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 233-37 
(1960). 
110 Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, ]., concurring) 
(retribution not justified) with id. at 306 (Stewart, ]., concurring) (retribution permis-
sible). While habitual offender laws have withstood legal attack in the past, such acts 
may be reconsidered. See Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 U. 
BUFF. L. REv. 99 (1971). 
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est.analysis of all the counts of.conviction should be used to determine 
whether consecutive sentences, concurrent sentences or a general sen-
tence should be imposed upon convictio:q. 
· Even where appellate courts assume that they have no general power 
to review sentences, they have attempted to develop some standards fot 
the trial judge sentencing in multiple conviction situations.111 The ex-
istence of multiple offenses within a statutory scheme proscribing sim-
ilar conduct has not been treated as indicative of a legislative purpose to 
authorize trial judges tQ impose several sentences either consecutively 
or concurrently upon conviction. Rather, the appellate courts have used 
canons of statutory construction to develop standards for sentencing. 
Given a legislative scheme that allows for the prosecution and convictiorl 
of an individual on several counts or offenses under a single indictment, 
the appellate coUrt: can choose between the rule of leniency112 and the 
rule of harshness in 'determining legislative intent. The rule of leniency 
has been employed to require that the trial judge impose only a single 
sentence where the legislative intent as tQ multiple punishm,ent is hi 
doubt or where the intent was to provide alternative avenues of prosecu-
tion or to create alternative classes of wrong .doers differe:qt~ated by 
graduations of punishment.113 However, the rule of harshness' is ·used it 
the appellate court perceives a clear legislative sentenci!lg policy to au-;-
thoriie multiple punishments in th'e ena.ctment Qf the. stat;ut~.U4 As a 
iCS?lt of the use'of the two canons of construction, a'pers~rt convicted of 
various federal narcotic violations under a single indic~ent .formerly 
was subject to consecutive sentences,115 while a person convicted of mul.: 
tiple counts under the federal bank robbery statute was 5ubject to onlY 
a· ~ingle sentence. The justification offered for this diSparity in treatme~~ 
is based on the two kinds 'of perceived legislative policies towards sen7 
tencing in the enactment of the offenses. · 
The harshness-leniency distinction leads to haphazard applications11~ 
since the distinction assumes, in line with the existing analysis, that· the 
development of standards for sentencing is essentially a legislative pre: 
rogative. Under the proposed model, the principles of dispositions fot 
multip~e convictions should be developed through an interest analysisl-
111 See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Prince v. United States, 352 
U.S. 322 (1957); United 'States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952). . 
112Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALEL.J. 262, 313 (1965). · .: 
113 But see Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 391 (1957). · 
' 11~/d. 
115/d. at 388. 
nssee Heideman v.·United States, 281 F.2d 8,05 (8th C~. 19~0) (six 'forged money 
oraers-six convictions); Carlson v. United States,- 274 ·F.2d 694 (~~h .. Cf: _196_0) (£oj$cd, 
checks-four years for each of four checks). · \ · ' · · ·, ·· 
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The goal of such principles -is to define the. limits of· the trial judge?s 
authority to impose what should be viewed ·as unnecessary judicial: mtil-
tiplication of pumshment. The multiple disposition dilemma under the 
.f~deral bank robbery statute presents an example of the inadequacy--of 
present attempts to develop appropriate standards under a statutory 
scheme which defines several ways in which an offense can be coni-
mitted.117 
· . In United States v. Prince118 the Supreme Court held that, for pur-
poses of sentencing, the conviction of an individual for both entering 
·with intent to rob and armed robbery constituted one offense. The Court 
reasoned that the lesser offense merged into the more aggrava~ed count119 
117 The federal bank robbery statute reads in part: 
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts 
to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or 
any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, man-
agement, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association; or 
Whoever enters or attempts to .enter any bank, credit union, or any sav-
ings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in pai:t: as a bank, 
credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in 
such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, 
or part thereof,· so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or 
such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United 
States, or any larceny-
Shall be fined not more than .$5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty 
years, or both. 
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any 
property or money or any other thing in value exceeding $100 belonging 
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, 
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more 
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or 
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any 
property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100 belonging 
to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession o£ any bank,' 
credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more 
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes 
of, any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to 
have been taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings and loan association, 
in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be subject to the punish-
ment provided by said subsection (b) for the taker. 
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense de-
fined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts " 
in jeopardy the life of any pe~son by the use of a dangerous weapon or de-
'. . vice. shall· b~ fin,ed. not· g10re than $10,000 or imprison~d not more than .. 
twenty-five years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)-(d) (1970). 
118 352 u.s. 322 (1957). 
119Jd. at 328. 
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and therefore vacated the trial judge's 20 and 15 year consecutive terms 
and ordered resentencing.l20 
The logical extension of the Court's merger theory, however, neces-
sarily will not prevent the multiplication of punishment if the trial judge 
has imposed a greater term under section 2113 (a) than under section 
2113 (d) of the federal bank robbery statute.121 Such was the case in 
United States v. Corson122 where the trial judge under a three count in-
dictment had sentenced the defendant to 10 years under Count I for 
violation of section 2113 (a) to be followed by a five year term for the 
violation of section 2113 (a) charged in Count II. The defendant also 
was sentenced to five years probation under Count III for violation of 
section 2113 (d), to run consecutively after the expiration of the prior 
15 year term. Two years after his imprisonment, the defendant filed a 
motion under rule 3 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
viding for the correction of an illegal sentence at anytime.123 The court 
faced a dilemma because of previous interpretation of the scope of the 
trial judge's power to modify a sentence under rule 35,124 and a logical 
interpretation of the merger theory meant that the only count that sur-
vived the merger was Count III.125 A desire for strict symmetry in the 
supposedly rational theory of merger of counts did not prevent the 
court from realizing the absurdity of allowing the defendant suddenly 
to be on probation or "set free" as the dissent urged.126 The court's solu-
tion was to require a general sentence on all counts rather than a single 
sentence on any particular count, 127 thereby preserving the right of the 
defendant to appeal the conviction on any one count128 and preventing 
the multiplication of punishment. However, the court had modified ex-
isting practice without explicit discussion. Because the imposition of con-
secutive or concurrent sentences under the bank robbery statute had 
been viewed as a technical error, a motion under rule 35 previously had 
not required the presence of the defendant for correction.129 Here the 
appellate court viewed the entire sentencing process as illegal since it 
was the culmination of sentencing that was error. Thus an order vacating 
the sentence on any particular count recently approved by the higher 
120 I d. at 329. 
121 See note 117 supra. 
122 449 F .2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971). 
123 Fro. R. CtuM. P. 35. 
124See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959). 
125 See United States v. Corson, 449 F .2d 544, 552 (3d Cir. 1971) (Hastie, J., dissenting). 
126 449 F .2d at 550-51. 
127 Id. at 552. 
128 Id. at 550. 
129 See United States v. Phillips, 403 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1968). 
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court would not correct the error. The appellate court required the 
presence of the defendant and required a resentencing, apparently with 
the presence of counsel over four years after his original sentence had 
been imposed.130 
The result in the case is correct under the analysis proposed, but the 
court refuses to acknowledge that despite hundreds of opinions dealing 
with the Prince doctrine, multiple sentences still exist.131 The court should 
have faced the issue of trial judge discretion directly. The heretofore 
technical error in sentencing is evidence of an improper exercise of judi-
cial discretion. The error is an indication that the judge has failed to 
understand that the legislature grants him limited authority to sentence.132 
A trial judge who ignores the implications of Prince in his sentencing has 
failed to understand the narrow federal interest in defining the conduct 
as criminal and the narrow scope of his dispositional power. The appel-
late court should articulate that, in terms of an interest analysis, the fed-
eral bank robbery statute promotes the federal government's interest in 
private property. Such an analysis would allow an appellate court to 
generate the other sentencing questions such as whether as a general rule 
a term of incarceration should be imposed for a violation of the statute, 
and if so, how long a period of incarceration is ordinarily necessary. 
The interest analysis could be applied more generally when an ap-
pellate court faces a situation of multiple· coiwictions. A state with com-
plete administrative sentencing such as California would want to take 
into consideration the-fact that another state agency would ·deCide the 
period of incarceration in setting parole eligibility periods.133 A state 
with a more conventional minimum and maximum indeterminate sen..: 
tencing scheme should move towards a system of general sentences based 
on the interest sought in the counts adjudicated. If the crinies are uri-
related in terms of an interest analysis a single sentence for each interest 
might be permissible. · 
The proposed analysis, however is insufficient at this junctui:e to sug-
gest a policy to deal with multiple sentence problems involvmg two juris-
dictions/34 as where a defendant serving' a sentence in state A is before 
a sentencing judge in state B. The analysis does suggest, however, that an 
appellate court seeking to develop such a policy should recognize that 
130 Id. at 964-65. It is not clear what-functian counsel' performs at this resentencing 
other than protecting against an increased· sentence, assuming an increase is impermissible 
in this situation. Cf. United States v. Chapman, 448 F.2d 1381 (3d Cii. 1971). 
131 See ·United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1972); 
132 United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 1970). 
133 See generally Johnson, Multiple Punis!mzent and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections 
(11l. the Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 357 (1970). 
134See R. DoNNELLY, J. GoLDSTEIN, & R. ScHwARTZ, CRIMINAL LA'Y 377-395 (1962).·. • 
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the sentencing problem relates to the two states' policy or lack of policy 
on detainers. A broader question which also must be resolved where an 
individual faces multiple punishment in different jurisdictions is the de-
gree of state control the total legal system may impose upon any one 
individual.135 
While the proposed analysis cannot suggest a clear path of reform to 
deal with all the problems of multiple punishment, appellate courts should 
begin to use the interest analysis to develop policy for multiple sentences. 
Judicially developed policy can distinguish the problems of multiple 
prosecution from the problems of multiple punishment although they 
are related under the interest analysis. Of particular importance are the 
emerging principles that will require a joinder of factually related claims 
in a single prosecution.136 Furthermore, judicially developed criteria can 
take into account the possible effects of multiple sentences upon indi-
viduals in other parts of the dispositional process. While the adverse ef-
fect of multiple sentences on parole release now is postulated rather than 
demonstrated,137 the judicial policy can evolve as decisions of correction-
al officials become more visible to the judiciary. The failure of the pro-
posed analysis to offer more guidance to appellate courts attempting to 
deal with the problems of multiple sentences in part is attributable to 
the failure of courts and commentators to develop legal rules to deal 
with the primary issues of single count sentencing. 
The Effect of the Individual's Refusal to Cooperate with the Legal Sys-
tem. The proposed analysis postulates that one of the interests 
promoted by the criminal laws is a concept of individual liberty, al-
though that concept may be only a policy from which to generate spe-
cific principles and rules138 and its implications for criminal law decision 
making are far from clear. However, the definition of the concept of 
liberty for some purposes may be derived from the fifth amendment in-
sofar as the amendment embodies a right of individual non-cooperation 
with the criminal process.139 Despite some attempt to extend such a 
right beyond adjudication to the disposition decision, a defendant's re-
fusal to cooperate with the legal process by refusing to come forward 
135 I d • 
. l36See Schaefer, Unresolved Issues of the Law of Double Jeopardy, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 
1391, 1398 (1970); Note Multiple Prosecution tmd Ptmislmzem of Unitary Criminal Con-
duct-Minn. Stat.§ 609.035,56 MINN. L. REv. 646,660 (1972). 
137 See generally Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1969). 
138See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967). 
139 But for other government purposes the fifth amendment is not defined in such a 
fashion. Cf. Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and the Hit-and-Rtm Opinions, 
1971 SUP. CT. REv. 1. 
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with information about the nature of his crime still may be used to justify 
the imposition of a harsher sentence than if the defendant had coop-
erated. Under the proposed analysis, appellate courts should review th~ 
application of fifth amendment principles and, therefore, must define the 
scope of the individual's right to refuse to cooperate with the legal sys-
tem at disposition. 
Where the guilt or innocence of the individual is being adjudicated, 
the legal system defines the concept of individual liberty to mean that 
the individual has a right not to cooperate with the adjudicatory process. 
As a principle of constitutional dimensions, this right often is embc;>died 
in the concept underlying the fifth amendment that the government 
should shoulder the entire burden of adjudication.140 In the investigative 
phase of the criminal process, the fifth amendment has been interpreted 
to mean that government officials have an obligation to inform t~e in-
dividual of his right to silence or non-cooperation.141 This right extend~ 
through trial, and the judge and the prosecutor may not even comment 
on the accused's silence for fear that the jury might infer guilt from the 
accused's failure to testify.142 Finally, the Supreme Court has evaluated 
the effect of various statutory sentencing schemes on the accused's right 
of non-cooperation and has invalidated schemes that tended to encourage 
individuals to forfeit such rights.143 
For appellate courts even to suggest that the fifth amendment mean~ 
that the individual has the same right not to cooperate at sentencing a5 
he has during adjudication demonstrates the need to distinguish between 
adjudication and disposition. The essence of any disposition compels the 
individual's cooperation. In fact, the fifth amendment embodies a right 
not to cooperate at adjudication because the result of the adjudicatory 
process is disposition. By maintaining the distinction between disposition 
and adjudication, the goal of minimizing state control could mean that 
some limits to the state's power to compel individual cooperation may 
exist. Before any such interest analysis is possible, however, overall stand-
ards for disposition must be developed. To be able to articulate standards 
for sentencing, the appellate courts must isolate the purpose of disposi-
tion in the given case. With a purpose of disposition in mind, a court 
then is able to decide what minimal amount of individual cooperation 
must be required in order to achieve the dispositional goal. 
140See United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n 
o£New York, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
141 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
142 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
143 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
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Courts committed to the existing approach to sentencing recognize 
the need for some evidence on which to base their disposition decisions, 
and the practice of using pre-sentence reports thereby has developed. 
In their attempts to individualize sentencing, courts have relied on a 
wide range of evidence which concerns the convicted persons. Because 
the trial judge has complete discretion in the use ·of this information in 
his decision, the defendant arid his lawyer have had little need to examine 
the report. 
A few courts have recognized some danger in the use of pre-sentence 
reports and require that the report be disclosed to the defendant's law-
yer.144 Consistent with the existing analysis, the lawyer is given an op-
portunity to demonstrate the inaccuracy or unreliability of the informa-
tion in the report.145 The idea that the lawyer might use the information 
gained through disclosure to request the application of a particular rule 
of sentencing has not yet been developed. Furthermore, the rule of trial 
judge discretion in sentencing through the use of pre-sentencing reports 
in at least some instances is equivalent to a rule of probation officer dis-
cretion, since it is the probation officer who gathers the information used 
by the judge. The legal system, however, provides no guidance as to 
what kinds of information are relevant since no rules currently exist for 
the grant or denial of probation. The need to control probation officers 
l;las been indicated by some courts, but without explicit discussion of 
sentencing policy. 
When the probation officer exceeds his admittedly wide latitude in 
gathering information about the defendant, the sentence imposed by the 
trial judge constitutionally is invalid if the judge relied upon the informa-
tion.146 The rule apparently is that a confession-information from the 
individual about to be sentenced-not legally admissible at adjudicative 
stages may not be used as evidence in sentencing. The purpose behind the 
rule appears to be to keep the probation officer from asking improper 
questions of the defendant and is not an attempt to overturn an incorrect 
sentence. Clearly, therefore, there currently is no way to ensure the im-
position of a proper disposition at resentencing. The ineffectiveness of 
the rule demonstrates the need to develop standards that determine what 
evidence is relevant and rules that prevent probation officers from ex-
ercising more coercive power over an individual's fate than is necessary. 
144 See State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969). 
145 See Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports: A Comtitutirmal Right to Rebttt 
Adverse lnfo1'111ation by Cross-Examination, 3 RUT. CAMDEN L.J. 111 (1971). 
14.6See United States ex rei. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282 (:Jd Cir. 1969). 
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More ·generally, guidelines are neeqed for determining what are· the 
proper-means of gatherip.g evidence for the sentencing decision.147 
Under existing analysis, some appellate courts have discussed the rela..: 
tionship of plea bargaining to the -trial judge sentencing policy~ When a 
trial judge· indicated on the record, perhaps foolishly under present 
standards, that he gave the defendant a harsher sentence because the de~ 
fendant had pleaded not-guilty after his codefendant pleaded guilty, an 
appellate court invalidated the sentence.148 The appellate court thought 
that the effect of such a policy· of differentiation at sentencing tended to 
discourage other defendants from pl~ading not guilty. In. another de-
cision, a trial judge indicated that he had imposed a harsh sentence be-
cause the defendant had pleaded not guilty; the appellate court invalidated 
the sentence, but without defining the parameters of the defendant's fifth 
amendment right not to cooperate at sentencing.149 In most cases, ap-
pellate courts have no evidence on which to invalidate .the trial .judge's 
s~ntence because trial judges generally are no~ ,required to state_ ·.~he 
grounds for the sentence they impose.150 ):he appellate decisions discussed 
147 Existing analysis is inadequate to determine what means of gathering evidence for 
the sentencing decisions are proper. Cumpare United States v. V-erdugo, 402 F .2d 599, 
616 (9th Cir.) (Browning, ]., separate opinion), cert. denied, 397 U.~ .. 925 (1968) (in-
dication that an individual's "right'' of privacy is violated by the use of illegally seized 
evidence at sentencing) with United States ~· Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 ~ED.N;Y.), 
lljf'd, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (refusal to reduce 
a sentence where the judge has used evidence illegally obtained by the_ police· in: tJie 
original ·sentence). Using the concept of liberty is a tool of analysis rather than the 
broad notions of an exclusionary rule or rights of f.:lirness, it is apparent that the Second 
Circuit result is the correct view. The imponant i5:>ue at sentencing is control over a 
particular state official-the probation .officer-whose conduct will affecy the individual 
directly. To the degree the concept of liberty is viewed as e!Jlbodying the notion of 
non-cooperation, ·the rule requiring a resentence where the probation officer questioned 
improperly is a correct one. See United States ex rel: Brown v. Runde!, 417 F.2d 28~ 
(3d Cir. 1969). However, if the primary purpose of the fourth amendment is to pr~tect 
individuals from unreasonable government intrusion, the supervision by the probation 
officer is a form of government control that entails some intrusions upon the individual. 
Any attempt to develop legal rules for d~position should recognize th'<lt a dispositional 
official h'Ke a probation officer, who is of most immediate concern to the convicted in-
dividual, may make intrusions upon the individual that an investigative agent cannot. 
Similarly, the dispositional official cannot perform the functions_ of an in~estigative 
agent. Thus the probation officer in charge of a halfway house can search an ~mate's 
room without a warrant but cannot question the inmate about the crime without legally 
required warnings. State v. Williams, 486_S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1972). . ... , , 
What types of constitutional infirmity in a prior conviction render its use as evidence 
at sentencing illegal has also divided couns. Compare United States v. Penta, 475 _F.2d 
92, 96 (Ist Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J., concurring) with Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 
1969). . . ' . \ . ,' 
. 148 See United States v. Scott, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969). ~- · 
149 See United States· v. Thomas, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966). 
150 See Frankel, supra note 6, at 9. ': - · 
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above simply may encourage trial judges not to give any indications as 
to the reasons for their decisions, thus decreasing the amount of evidence 
available for appellate review. 
The failure of the courts to articulate the impact on sentencing of the 
accused's right not to cooperate with the legal process, as recognized at 
adjudication, has led to a dilemma for the criminal law. A defendant 
who received the maximum sentence for the crime he had committed 
argued that his fifth amendment rights had been violated where the trial 
judge indicated that the sentence had something to do with the failure 
of the defendant to come forward with more information about the na-
ture 'Of his crime.151 Consistent with the proposed analysis, the trial judge 
had reasoned that the crime was one of public corruption which was a 
crime against state processes. The apparent sentencing policy was deter-
rence of others.152 Furthermore, the judge specifically stated that where 
the crime of public corruption was involved, he was under no obligation 
to consider rehabilitation as a possible goal of sentencing.153 Because the 
defendant refused to identify others who may have been involved with 
the public corruption, the trial judge reasoned that there was no reason 
to mitigate the sentence.154 On review, the appellate court simply dis-
missed the defendant's fifth amendment claim on the grounds that the 
defendant's right of appeal had not been infringed and that the sentence 
was within the trial judge's discretion.155 The trial judge's opinion ex-
plicitly had raised a serious issue of sentencing policy concerning whether 
sentencing may be used as an investigative tool to expose the alleged 
criminal activity of others. Under the proposed analysis, the appellate 
court should have decided whether such sentencing policy constituted 
too much legal control over the particular individual who happened to 
be apprehended and convicted.156 By sidestepping these issues, the ap-
pellate court failed to develop sentencing standards badly needed by the 
lower courts. 
A rule for dispositions that the trial judge should not consider mitiga-
tion of the sentence in a crime of public corruption unless the defendant 
151 United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972). 
i52 See icl. at 182 n.2. 
153]cl. 
154 If the defendant later cooperated, the parole board might mitigate the sentence at 
that time. See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
u.s. 911 (1971). 
155 454 F .2d at 183-84. 
156 Admitting the morality of deterrence of others as a legitimate goal of sentencing 
of a given individual does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that the legal system 
should use the particular individual to apprehend other suspected individuals. See g~mo 
erally Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 649 (1970). 
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comes forward to id_entify his cohorts may well be compatible with the 
proposed approach'. The interest analysis attempts to limit state control 
over convicted individuals to the minimum extent necessary to achieve 
the state's dispositional goal. Rules for sentencing thus must strike a bal-
ance between the government's need for information to pursue its disposi-
tional goal and the individual's right of non-cooperation. In this context, 
the goal of promoting a concept of individual liberty plays a large role in 
criminal law decision making. 
The selection of the permissible range of dispositions that is authorized 
upon any adjudication of criminality is, of course, a legislative functiori. 
Even under the interest analysis some judicially developed rules for sen-
tencing, particularly those replacing the latitude traditionally granted to 
trial judges, similarly would be subject to legislative modification or 
reversal. Nevertheless, such legislative review would have to be guided 
by some judicially-imposed limitations since the judiciary has the power 
to declare some legislatively authorized dispositions illegal. Other judicial-
ly developed rules might reflect policies so fundamental to modern crim-
inal law that they would have a constitutional basis not subject to direct 
legislative modification. If the legislature disagreed with a particular 
penal policy articulated in court opinions developing or applying rules 
of sentencing, it should reformulate the policy only after careful con-
sideration of the implications of the court's policy for legal rule making. 
PART II 
.ALLOCATING DEciSION MAKING REsPoNSIBILITY BETWEEN THE jUDICIARY 
AND CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
The extension of the due process revolution to sentencing has ended 
the era of judicial reluctance to review inmates' complaints against cor-
rection officials' decisions.157 Courts no longer speak in terms of "grace" 
or "privilege" 158 when reviewing constitutional challenges to co~ection 
decisions concerning internal prison discipline and parole. However, un-
less all decisions by correction officials are to involve constitutional is-
sues for judicial resolution, principles of limitations on judicial review 
must be found to guide courts in deciding the question of which decisions 
may be left to the discretion of correction officials and which must be 
approved or disapproved by the judiciary. 
The answer to that broad question lies in a legal analysis that allocates 
decision making between the judiciary and criminal administrative agen-
157 See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); McGinnis v. Royster, 332 F. Supp. 973 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
158 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 474 (1972). · 
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cies. The analysis previously proposed to develop standards for trial 
judge sentencing begins with the concept 'Of individual liberty embodying 
the overall goal of minimizing the amount of state control over convicted 
individuals. This concept should begin the analysis of post-sentencing 
problems as well. An equally important goal, but one which potentially 
conflicts with the goal of minimizing state control, is that of maintaining 
state control over convicted individuals. This continuing control should 
be justified because, if the proposed approach to sentencing in Part I is 
adopted, there should be some assurance that the individuals in prison 
are those whose incarceration will promote the goals of the legal system. 
Another point of departure is the distinction between adjudication and 
disposition. The effect of the distinction in the post-sentence area is that 
it permits courts to recognize that parole and prison officials are not, and 
should not be, the same kind of decision makers as judges, and that the 
rules developed should reflect this difference. The present analysis used 
in judicial review of intra-prison discipline practices and parole decisions 
often has achieved the proper allocation of decision making responsibil-
ity, but the courts have not always recognized explicitly the issue of 
proper allocation. The proposed analysis makes explicit the issue of al-
location and raises questions for judicial resolution if the present trend 
of judicial review of correction decisions continues. 
LIMITATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS WITHIN THE 
STATE INCARCERATION PROCESS 
·Legislatures have delegated to a variety of agencies the authority to 
control inmates confined in penal institutions.159 Like most administrative 
!>g~es, thes_e agencies have implicit rule malting powers that include the 
j)qwer to promulgate J;Ules of conduct. The penal institutions are unique 
among criminal administra~ve agencies in that the penal officials may 
develop form~l and informal processes to impose sanctions for breaches 
of rules and regulations. Prison officials may impose sanctions by altering 
tpe terms upon which an inmate receives food, clothing, and medical 
,c~e, an<;! even by limiting the social intercourse available with other 
~ates. Applying the concept of liberty, a court should determine 
whether the ljmitations on individual freedom which these sanctions 
represent are 'rational iri terms of the ptirposes of the confinement. 
: . 'fhe judiciary should modify its present constitutional analysis of the 
wi.de variety of sanctions used in prison. The courts first should limit the 
-~le making power -of the prison admini~tration to the promulgation of 
·l59See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4002 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN;§ 46-131 (1964); CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81 (Supp. 1973); FLA~ STAT. ANN. §~ 944.09, 944.14 (1973); 
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rul~ that articulate what conduct will subject an individual to some 
sanction. Second, ·a proceeding to determille whether the proscribed con-
duct has occurred should be required to insure thelegitimacy of the irrl-
pcisition of any sanctions. Third, the courts should limit the form and 
~ature of the sanctions available to prison officials. 
Limits on Promulgation. Judicial limitations on the authority·of 
prison officials to proscribe conduct through prison rules serve two pur-
poses. First, such limitations are a means of requiring a logical nexus be-
tween conduct sanctioned by prison rules and the purp'ose of confine"' 
ment in the particular institution. Prison officials should not be able· to 
proscribe conduct which, had it occurred outside the institution, :would 
have been adjudicated in the criminal process. "Low visibility'' prison 
fact :finding cannot perform all of the functions of criminal adjudication, 
~pecially to the extent that criminal adjudication is the means of articu-
lating the fundamental interests of modem criminal law. Second, the 
proposed limitations on the rule making power of prison officials force 
such officials to consider the implications of the concept of individual 
liberty within the prison. In devising a prison disciplinary code under 
these limitations, the prison officials still have the option of reviewing the 
offending conduct in an intra-prison fact :finding process, subjecting th~ 
accused inmate to a criminal adjudication, or of ,not applying any_ legal 
machinery to the situation. When the last option is chosen, a concep~ of 
liberty is promoted within the state confinement process in that the con-
duct cannot further be sanctioned by any state official. · · · 
The :first limitation that the judidary should impose upon the cor-
rection officials' rule making power is that there must be written rules.160 
Within the broad goal of protecting the security of the particular insti-
tution, the prison officials should devise rules to protect the inmates and 
prison employees from invasions of their persons and private .property. 
However, the scope of these rules should be limited so as to minimize 
overlap with the protections provided by the criminal process for bodily 
security and private property. 
The proper exercise of this rule making .power may be demonstrated 
in the development of prison rules concerning assaults in a maximum 
security prison. Simple assaults between inmates should be governed by 
rules which recognize that when individuals live together in close prox-
imity, some ir).terference with bodily security is inevitable. The rules also 
must recognize that, despite the goal of protecting bodily security in the 
c~~al law, there are instances where the legal system chooses ~ot to 
160 See L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY oF LAw 46 {rev. ed.: 1969). 
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use its most coercive sanctions against an individual guilty of assault, as 
in the case of simple assaults between family members.161 By analogy, 
the occurrence of conduct in the prison that otherwise might lead to a 
minor criminal conviction need not require criminal adjudication if the 
intra-prison discipline process serves some minimal social function. By 
"sanctioning" the simple assault within the prison, the legal system pro-
motes the security of the prison through the use of the least coercive 
instrument. 
The allocation to prison officials of responsibility to define a simple 
assault allows the scope of the category to be determined at the appro-
priate level. Thus, a minimum or medium security prison may have a 
broader category of s4nple assaults than a maximum security institution. 
The goal of maintaining prison security may be given a different empha-
sis in each kind of institution. By delineating the question for rule mak-
ing, the judiciary simply would be recognizing that the matter is within 
the expertise 'Of the prison officials who can best determine what risks 
they are willing to take in devising rules of conduct within the range 
of sanctions available. 
However, if the charge against an inmate is aggravated assault against 
a prison guard or fellow inmate, the intra-prison discipline system may 
be an inappropriate agency to apply sanctions. The alleged conduct is 
sufficiently serious to invoke the criminal process, and the prison pro-
cedures lack the legitimization necessary to justify the imposition of 
major dispositions. The courts should limit the rule making power of the 
prisons where serious crimes are involved, thereby preserving the ad-
judicative functions of the criminal law and avoiding serious constitu-
tional questions. 
Another broad limitation 'On the rule making power of prisons which 
already has been adopted by some courts is the application of a "standard 
of necessity" in reviewing prison officials' decisions.162 The proposed 
analysis would articulate the necessity standard in terms of the concept 
of individual liberty and protection 'Of prison security. For instance, one 
court recently held that an inmate could not be sanctioned for writing 
a letter critical of the prison administration to someone outside the pris-
161 See notes 222-225 infra and accompanying text. 
162 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright v. McMann, 387 
F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); Ramsey v. Ciccone, 310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Holt 
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (ED. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Jordan 
v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (ND. Cal. 1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hen-
drick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). See also Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the 
Police and Sentencing Proc~sses, 75 HARv. L. REv. 904 (1962). 
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on.163 Although the court spoke solely in terms of the inmate's right of 
free expression,l64 an equally significant consideration was that the con-
duct presented no threat to prison security.165 
In another decision, prison officials were not permitted to punish an 
inmate for kissing his wife good-bye while on work release.166 \Vhile the 
court spoke in terms of the adverse effects upon rehabilitation in limiting 
social intercourse, the result should have been justified on the basis of the 
standard of necessity and the requirement of pre-existing rules. There is 
no clear necessity to prohibit the· inmate's ordinary social intercourse 
while on work release. Furthermore, the court could have decided the 
case by holding that conduct which does not violate any specific pre-
existing rules cannot be sanctioned. The latter rationale does not require 
the court to endorse a particular penal policy and thereby allows leeway 
for the development of specific rules by prison officials to govern the 
conduct. The prison administration might be able to justify a specific 
rule prohibiting or limiting social intercourse on work release on the 
basis of some policy behind the work release program, and such a rule 
might prohibit the kissing. The purpose of forcing legal distinctions .to 
be made on the basis of the policies behind work release rather than the 
harm or value in kissing is to minimize the direct interference by the 
state with normal social intercourse. 
Legitimizing the Imposition of Prison Stmctions. Courts. have 
begun to apply principles of "rudimentary due process" 167 to the review 
of sanctions imposed by prison administrators, leading to a requirement 
that some legitimizing process take place before the inmate is made to 
suffer "grevious loss." 168 Under the approach, grevious loss to the in-
mate involves denial of the benefits of normal social intercourse in prison 
or collateral consequences such as loss of good time credit.169 The legiti-
mizing process under current practice most frequently invoJves the f91-
1Qwing features: 
1) Noi::ice of accusation and of the evidence against the accused' 
inmate; · · 
2) An opportunity to r.ebut the evidence presented; 
163See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp: 544 (W.D. Wis. i972), rev'd, 1~ GRIM. L. REP. 
2378 (7th Cir., Jan. 17, 1973). · 
164Seeid. at 544-45. 
1G5Jd. at 553-54; see Note, Priscm Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, ·81 YALE 
L.J. 87, 108-11 (1971). , . . 
·166 Colen v. Norton, 10 CruM:.L. REP. :2358 (D.C. Conn: 1972). 
· 167 Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781-85 (N.D. Chl. 197i). 
168Jd. at 784-85. 
169 McGinnis v. Royster, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D;N.Y. 1971), iev'd, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). 
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3) A hearing before a person not directly involved in the alleged 
incident of misconduct; and 
4) A written decision.170 
Such a fact :finding process would better serve its purposes of legitimiz-
,ing the imposition of a prison sanction if its scope were defined by a 
limitation on the power of the prison to promulgate disciplinary rules. 
The potential for such a limitation was ignored when one of the many 
courts which engaged in rudimentary due process analysis held that the 
presence of counsel is required at a prison disciplinary hearing whenever 
the alleged offending conduct also could lead to a criminal prosecution.171 
The_ court also required adequate notice, cross examination of adverse 
witnesses, a decision based on submitted evidence, a decision by an un-
biased fact finder, and a right to appeal to afford the inmate due proc-
ess.172 The court should have analyzed the issue in terms of the compe-
tence of the prison disciplinary hearing to adjudicate conduct that might 
lead to the imposition of another prison term. The proposed analysis sug-
g~ that an aggravated assault on a prison guard should not be treated 
as a violation of a prison rule, but rather that the regular criminal process 
should be invoked. The court should have enjoined the prison from con-
ducting any disciplinary proceeding and_ ordered a speedy trial for the 
inmate. Had this approach been taken, the judiciary could have de-
veloped a_rule for allocating decision making which recognized that the 
adjudication of criminality is a judicial function. 
In .general, the existing rudimentary due process analysis of prison dis-
cipliPary hearings should be viewed in terms of allocating decision mak-
ing. So viewed, administrative review of the prison's imposition of sanc-
tions also should be required. If each prison has its own disciplinary rules 
and process of determining violations, the right to appeal to the depart-
ment of corrections further legitimizes prison decisions. Overall penal 
policies in a given jurisdiction would be developed by the department 
and applied in its review of prison decisions. These policies should be 
explicitly articulated, and the department should be required to give 
written reasons for its approval or modifications of prison decisions. For 
170 See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653-54 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clu!=hettc v. 
·Piocunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 7Bl-85 (ND·. Cal. 1971): 
171 See Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Alternatives to 
requiring the presence of lawyers should be considered in selecting the means to protect 
.inmates' rights. Compare Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (MD. Fla. 1972) with 
Cluchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (ND. Cal. 1971). A "lay advocate" or law 
student could be used as a decision maker in the criminal law for some purposes. Cf. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (Brennan, J.; concurring); Johnson v. 
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) • 
. "1'12.328 F. Supp. at 782-84. · . · · 
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instance, a department of corrections might approve a prison's hearing 
procedures which were modeled on the mediation method of resolving 
disputes. An articulation of the reasons for a department's approval of 
such a procedure in terms of overall policy also would increase the likeli-
hood of judicial approval if the procedure were questioned by any in-
mate.173 
Judicial review would be necessary to correct possible mistakes of the 
prison fact .finding process. The scope of judicial review should be lim-
ited to review of the decisions and the rules enunciated by the depart-
ment of corrections. However, the judiciary also might have to inter-
vene to protect constitutional rights by directing that an individual's con-
duct be adjudicated either through the regular criminal process or the 
intra-prison disciplinary process. Ideally the courts should intervene to 
determine the proper forum before any adjudication takes place; how-
ever, this intervention more likely will be an after-the-fact determination 
that the individual was properly or improperly processed. The litigable 
issues before the courts increasingly should become whether the factmil 
determination was supported-by the evidence and whether the processes 
of promulgation and adjudication conform to the purposes of intra-prison 
disposition. · 
Limits on the Nature of Disposition. The process of delineating 
the scope of sanctions prison officials may impose already has begun un-
der existing analysis. The use of corporal punishnient,. other forms·. :of 
physical abuse,174 and overly restrictive diets175 have been declared ·np.l.. 
permissible dispositions for the violation of prison disciplinary rules. The 
total control exercised over the individual by the prison· instittition re-
quires a careful delineation of· sanctions. The use of segregation as a 
sanction for violating a prison rule against ~ssault may. be. permissible, 
but the denial of medical care w_hile in solitary may not be. The loss of 
recreational privileges or work privileges may be appropriate for lesser 
violations such as possession of contraband 'Or theft of prison property 
or the property of other inmates. Given· the broad scope for the promuJ-
gation of rules by the institutions and the nature of intra-prison adjudica-
tion, the dispositional devices available to correctional officials should be 
limited. Wide discretion in the maximum and miriimum number of days 
in solitary confinement would tend to le~d to arbitrary use of official 
state power. The process of promulgation properly should includ~ con-
173 See Note, Bargaining in Co"ectional lnstitu,tions: ReStrUcturing the Relation Be-
tween the hnnate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 729-34 (1972). 
174See Jackson v. Bishop; 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.1968). 
175 See. Landman v.Royster, 333}f. Supp. 621,627-28 (E.D. Va.1971). 
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sideration of whether mandatory penalty schemes for an intra-prison 
.discipline system would tend to promote more rational dispositions.176 
THE DECISION TO RELEASE ON PAROLE 
The existing analysis of parole decisions should be redefined in terms 
, of allqcating decision making responsibility between the judiciary and 
what is in effect another criminal adminiStrative agency in order to de-
velop standards for parole decisions. The judiciary should require some 
standards for parole board decision making since the status of parole is a 
form of conditional liberty that all inmates are presumed to prefer to 
incarceration. Under the proposed analysis, the development of stand-
ards for these decisions involves drawing distinctions that effectuate the 
fundamental interesi: in a concept of liberty. Although the existing ap-
proach permits an inmate to seek judicial review of a denial of parole,177 
it fails to provide standards for either the parole decisions or judicial re-
view to determine which denials are arbitrary. 
In articulating standards for review, the courts should recognize that 
some legitimate considerations in parole decision making may differenti-
ate it significantly from judicial decision making. First, the particular 
nature of the legislative mandate to the parole board will influence the 
kinds of standards that are developed. Second, the courts must take into 
consideration the particular agency that will administer the standards 
·promulgated by the court to achieve its goals. Thus, the standards ap-
plied to a criminal administrative agency in its choice of penal policy 
should be less restrictive than those applicable to a trial judge at sen-
tencing. Third, the courts should recognize that their role essentially is 
one of review, so that their decision not only affects the outcome of the 
particular case under review but also encourages a particular decision 
making policy by the parole board. 
The actual wording of the typical legislative mandate to a parole 
board provides little guidance to the parole board in its decision to grant 
or deny parole. The statute usually prohibits the use of certain criteria 
. for granting parole, such as good conduct, unless the board believes the 
convict will become a law-abiding citizen on release.178 Despite the 
176 Cf. AMEruCAN FRIENDs SERVICE CoMMITIEE, STRUGGLE FOR JusnCE 147-48 (1971). 
177 See' Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971). The 
parole board may even be required to give written reasons for a denial. ld. at 246-49, 
277 A.2d at 197-99 . 
. ·178 A typical statute provides that: 
No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good con-
duct or efficient performance of duties assigned while under sentence, but 
only if the board is of the opinion th'<lt there is reasonable probability that, 
if such prisoner is released, he will assume his proper ana rightful place in 
1973] SENTENCING 43 
statute's failure to provide criteria for the denial of parole, the courts 
could interpret the statutory scheme as mandating that parole board 
decision making consist of a risk analysis of the likelihood that an indj.:. 
vidual will or will not violate the criminal law if released.179 A legislative 
mandate of a decision based on risk analysis means that the parole board 
rather than the judiciary should be the principal decision maker. The 
court's influence on the standards that the board might develop should 
be limited to requiring that the denials not be arbitrary. In effect this 
becomes a requirement that the denial should be rational in terms of the 
purposes of parole. Given the present uncertainty as to the purposes of 
parole, however, the reviewing court should approve the board's decision 
so long as some purpose has been articulated and made the basis for the 
grant or denial of parole. 
The board should be free to choose between the penal policies of ·re-
straint, reform, rehabilitation, or reintegration in articulating the purp<;>se 
of parole which underlies its decisions. While the terminology used- to 
describe the various policies is borrowed from the disciplines of crim-
inology and penology, these policies are essentially different perspectives 
on the broad purposes of state confinement and correction process gen-
erally.180 The terminology's utility to the development of legal standards 
is that the variety of policies represents different views of the necessity 
of incarceration to achieve the particular purpose of state control deemed 
appropriate. A board, for instance, might adopt the policy of restraipt 
for those confined in maximum security institutions and the policy of 
reintegration for those confined in minimum security institutions. Under 
the proposed analysis a reviewing court should give effect to the board's 
differentiation in its determination that a denial was or was not rational. 
However, the tentative decision as to the appropriate penal policy is for 
the parole board.181 
society, without violation of the law, and that his release is not incompatible 
with the welfare of society. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.14 (1964); see D. Glaser and V. O'Leary, Dept. of H.E.W., 
Personal Characteristics and Parole Outcome (1966) (sociological survey of personal 
characteristics as they relate t() parole outcome; a "handy" booklet for the decision 
maker, but one which fails to refer to ·criteria as being legally permissible). 
179 Since the board is a criminal administrative agency, it should restrict its analysis 
to the likelihood of violations of the criminal law rather than the mores of society in 
general. 
180 See Duffee & O'Leary, Models of Correction: An Entry in the Packer-Gritfiths 
Debate, 7 CruM. L. BULL, 329, 339-45 (1972). 
181 Since the choice of penal policy may determine the rationality of parole denials, 
an understanding of the similarities and differences between th"e £our possible policies 
is vital. All four policies permit the parole board to engage in the kind of risk analysis 
that is prescribed by the legislature. However, the policies of restraint and reform place 
greater emphasis in decision making on the social interest in controllipg the individual 
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:_ After the parole board has chosen a policy, the crjteria it should con-
sider· in denying or granting parole are the J;otality of the inmate's crim-
inal conduct, the psychiatric or other penological evaluation, and the in-
·dividual's intra-prison discipline record.l82 The importance of any one 
factor will vary with the particular policy chosen by the board. The 
totality of the inmate's criminal conduct should be considered since the 
legislative mandate directs the parole board to judge the individual's risk 
of recidivism. For the purposes of parole decision making past conduct 
can be used as a factor in determining the risk of future misconduct.133 
Psychiatric or other e~ert evaluations are relevant because the parole 
decision is essentially a predictive judgment about future human be-
havior. These expert opinions, while not determinative, clearly merit 
consideration. The individual's intra-prison record is a permissible criteria 
only if the intra-prison discipline process operates under the previously 
suggested methods. The disciplinary record is relevant in that the in-
mate's ability io conform his behavior to a system of rules within the 
state incarceration process might aid in predicting his ability to conform 
to the rules in the larger community. 
The judiciary should review parole denials in such a manner as to en-
courage parole boards to use the three above mentioned factors in their 
decisions. To some extent this could be accomplished if reviewing courts 
offender than do rehabilitation and reintegration. The penal policy of restraint would 
lead to parole decisions that emphasized the community's attitude towards the violator 
and parole would be granted only to those deemed acceptable to the community. Duffee 
& O'Leary, supra note 180, at 344. 
The policy of reform similarly emphasizes community attitudes, but a board operating 
under such a policy would look to the inmate to see if he evidences that he has adopted 
community norms while incarcerated. Id. at 341. The risk analysis dictated by a policy 
of ref.orm would seek to ascertain a convergence of individual and community values. 
Such an analysis probably would lead to an inquiry into whether an inmate is likely to 
lead a productive life rather than whether he will violate the criminal law, Id. at 340. 
The other two possible policies-rehabilitation and reintegration-both place great em-
phasis on the particular characteristics of the individual. A board committed to rehabil-
itation would focus on the issue of the inmate's response to the institution's program 
of treatment. Id. at 343. Such treatment programs might involve either institutional worlc 
programs or psychotherapy. The board also would rely on medical or psychological 
evaluations of the inmate. Once the program· of treatment was completed the individual 
would be released. The policy of reintegration would seek to restore the inmate to 
.the larger community through the·use of as many resources as possible in the outside 
community. A board adopting reintegration as the guiding policy for its decisions 
would rely as much as possible on social processes within the larger community to 
prevent future breaches o£ the criminal law. Such reliance in .some cases might require 
a decision to release without any 5pecific evidence of the efficacy of social processes 
to prevent future criminal. behavior for the particular individual involved. 
• 182 These factors reflect' all four penal policies and provide inputs from the various 
·institutions that influence parole decision malcing. 
· 183. The statute inay also 'suggest these criteria. See note 178 supra. 
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explicitly- ·delineated the crite~ia which cannot influence a· decision to 
deny parole. Such factors as ..the inmate's employment prospects,- tinie 
served, and extent of participation in institutional programs, for example, 
should not be considered. Using the inmate's lack of employment pros-
pects as a reason for denying par{)le would violate the overall goal of 
diminishing the in:fluence of an individual's economic status on the out-
come of criminal decision making:184 Consideration of the length of time 
served tends to multiply the effect of the prior determination to incar-
cerate on the subsequent parole decision involving individual liberty:~ 
The time served simply is reflective of sentencing policy, and the board 
instead should look to the nature of the criminal conduct. which. led to 
the decision to incarcerate. Finally, consideration of the lack of partici-
pation by the inmate in non-mandatory institutional programs as a factor 
in denial of parole compels the individual to cooperate with the state 
incarceration process without articulating any specification of a reason 
for the compulsion. 
Clearly, however, factors which may not be used to deny parole may 
be relevant to a decision to grant it. Under any of the various penal 
policies, a board could justify the parole of an individual who has been 
active in voluntary institutional programs, has served a long period of 
incarceration, {)r has a job awaiting his release. Nothing suggested her~ 
should prevent an individual from presenting these factors as evidence 
to the parole board to justify release. The proposed analysis, however, 
focuses on those decisions that interfere with individual liberty and thus 
is concerned only with denials of parole. · , 
The reviewing court can encourage .the board to use the proper factors 
in making parole decisions by clearly articulating the court's own view 
of "rationality." Thus, the court can encourage the board to choose 
proper penal policies by making clear that a particular decision may b~ 
rational under one policy but irrational, and therefore subject to reverfial~ 
if another has been chosen. Perhaps the only absolute limitation on the 
board's freedom of choice, however, is that all individuals within one 
institution must be deemed to be under the same policy. The court also 
can encourage the parole board and the legislature to improve decision 
making by adopting a rebuttable presumption on review in favor of 
parole, regardless of the policy chosen by the board. The court then 
should hold that, in the absence of evidence to explain the result in terms 
of the board's stated policy, a denial of parole is improper. Such a stand-
ard allows for review based on evidence in the record to justify the denial. 
In most ·caseS, if proper criteria are used and some_ evi<;l~nc;e is p.t;esent, 
184 See note 44 supra and accompanying text." 
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most denials will be upheld since the estimation of the risks involved in 
the individual case is essentially a parole board decision.185 
PART Ill 
DISPOSITIONAL CRITERIA FOR AUTHORIZED DISPOSITIONS TO 
AvoiD THE CRIMINAL REsuLT 
Legislatures have authorized confinement processes that purport to 
reform or rehabilitate individuals brought into the criminal process. In 
one category of cases the legislatures have adopted a "medical model" 
for the civil confinement of persons deemed in need of treatment in order 
to function properly in society.186 In another category of cases, a legisla-
ture has provided special dispositions to reform or rehabilitate individuals 
with a particular social status.187 Criteria for commitment must be de-
veloped that both protect the individual from arbitrary state control and 
promote greater understanding of human behavior within these confine-
ment processes. 
CONCEPTS OF LffiERTY IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESSES 
The first category "Of cases includes various forms of civil commitment, 
accompanied by a myriad of articulated rationales.188 These civil com-
mitment processes recently have come under scrutiny by the Supreme 
185 Whether a parole board must constitutionally give a reason for a denial is not 
discussed. See Scarpa v. United States Parole Bd., 13 GRIM. L. RPm. 2138 (5th Cir. Apr. 
2, 1973) (en bane); Beckworth v. Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 729 (1973). 
186 See generally Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife that Cms 
Both Ways," 51 JUDICATURE 370 (1968). 
187D.C. ConE ANN. § 24-601 to -615 (1967). As both types of compulsory state con-
finement processes have come under judicial scrutiny, the lack of expertise and resources 
at these special institutions has become clear. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. 
Cir.1966). 
188 Consider the Supreme Court's perhaps belated realization of. the problem: 
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons 
found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on the exercise of this 
power and the procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the States. 
The particular fashion in which the power is exercised-for instance through 
various forms of civil commitment, defective delinquency laws, sexual psy-
chopath laws, commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity-
reflects different combinations of distinct bases for commitment sought to 
be vindicated. The bases that have been articulated include dangerousness to 
self~ dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or training. 
Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarltable that 
the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more 
frequently litigated. 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1972). 
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Court in a trilogy of .cases involving a sexual psychopath statute,l89 ·a 
· commitment on grounds of. incompetency to stand trial, 190 and a con-
finement pursuant to a ·defective delinquent statute.191 The Court did 
. not invalidate any of the three statutory sche111es. However, employing 
fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection analysis, the 
Court articulated three principles which the judiciary must apply to con-
finement. First, the individual must be given an opportunity to adjudicate 
whether the legislature is making irrational and arbitrary distinctions be-
tween individuals convicted of crimes and those not convicted of crimes. 
Second, the nature of confinement must bear some relationship to the 
purpose of confinement. Third, the duration of confinement must be 
related to progress toward the purpose of confinement to prevent an in-
defirtite life term under the fiction that treatment is continuing but has 
not yet succeeded. ·. 
Humphrey v. Cady192 involved a broad constitutional attack on a state 
sex crime act by means of a federal habeas corpus petition. The district 
court had dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court held that the 
petitioner was entided to an evidentiary hearing on whether his recom-
mitment to a sexual psychopath institution was invalid because the com-
mitment of other allegedly mentally ill persons had been determined 
by a jury.193 Without deciding whether a jury determination is appro-
priate in the commitment p;rocess, the effect of the decision is to allow 
individuals greater ability to adjudicate the constitutionality of legisla-
tively-created classi.ficatipns. A prior decision had required that a men-
tally ill person convicted of a crime must be committed through the 
same processes as a non-criminal mentally ill person.194 Humphrey al-
lows an individual ~o adjudicate whether the legislature can make dis-
tinctions based on the symptQmatology Qf the allegedly mentally ill in-
dividual since the sex crimes commitment procedure existed solely for 
those convicted of certain types of crimes.l95 . 
Jackson v. Indiana196 not only established· that the nature of confine-
ment must bear some relation to the purpose of confinement, but also 
demonstrated that due process principles are not limited in application 
to dispositional processes which follow an adjudication of criminality. 
189 Humphreyv. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
190 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
191 McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). 
192 405 u.s. 504 (1972). . 
193[d. at 508. • 
194 See Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 109 (1966); 
195See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S .. 605 
(1967). . . . 
196 406 u.s. 715 (1972). 
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In I ackson the Court invalidated the confinement of an individual who 
had been charged with a crime but who was declared incompetent to 
.stand trial. The case questions directly the power of the state to confine 
. an individual without any "due process" adjudication of his conduct. 
The dilemma in I ackson was that the state did not want to proceed 
criminally against the accused because of his inability to participate in 
an adjudicatory process. A substantial possibility existed that the indi-
vidual would never be able to understand the legal proceedings/97 and 
the Court left it to the state either to determine if the individual would 
.be able to understand the proceedings in the foreseeable future or to 
seek some form of civil commitment.198 
Were the state to seek civil commitment upon remand, the Jackson 
decision required it to explore the possibility of commitment under the 
general civil commitment statute as well as the commitment procedures 
.for those alleged to be feeble-minded.199 Apparently, under the Hum-
.Phrey rationale, Jackson's attorney would be entitled to argue for com-
. mitment under the statutory scheme with the most liberal release stand-
ards or with the least stringent confinement process.200 Were Jackson 
found incompetent to stand trial, some aspects of the criminal process 
such as motions for pretrial dismissal of the indictment might occur.201 
The possibility existed that the allegation of Jackson's criminal conduct 
never would be adjudicated within the criminal process.202 If Jackson 
were confined under these circumstances, his disposition would not be 
criminal. 203 
Finally, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution204 held that it is a 
denial of due process to indefinitely confine a petitioner on the basis of 
an ex parte order committing him merely for observation; the term of 
confinement must be related to the purpose for which the individual was 
committed.205 Following a criminal conviction and prior to the expira-
197 Jackson apparendy was a 27 year old deaf mute who was unable to read or write. 
One doctor even had suggested that petitioner was unable to communicate in sign 
language.Id. at 719. 
· 198ld. at 739-41. 
199]d. at 728 n.6 . 
. 200 See notes 192-195 supra and accompanying text. 
201406 U.S. at 740-41. 
202 Jackson's right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment specifically was not 
decided by the Court. I d. at 740. 
203 The discussion assumes that Jackson is in need of some form of state confinement. 
Nothing should prevent Jackson's counsel from showing that no state confinement process 
is appropriate because Jackson is untreatable and is not in need of custodial care. See 
Burt & Morris, A Proposal For the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 66, 70 (1972). . 
204 407 u.s. 245 (1972). 
205]d. at 250. 
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cion of.his sentence, McNeil was sent to an institution for "defective 
delinquents" for an examination206 to determine whether the -officials at 
the institution should seek judicial commitment of him as a defective 
delinquent. One year after the expiration of his original!lentence, McNeil 
still had not been brought before a judge to determine if he was in fact 
a defective delinquent. The Supreme Court relied on ] ackson v. Indiana 
to invalidate his continued confinement on the grounds that the officials 
at the institution in effect had changed the purpose of his confinement 
from observation and examination to simple confinement.207 
In a companion case, the Court dismissed its grant of certiorari in a 
case directly questioning the scope and purpose of the defective de-
linquent dispositional process as defined by the legislature.208 Some of 
the individuals involved weJ;e entitled to some relief under existing law, 
while the others would have an opportunity to demonstrate eligibility 
for more stringent commitment standards and more liberal release pro-
visions for individuals not convicted of crimes under the principles estab-
lished in] ackson and Humphrey .209 More importantly, the court invited 
the state legislature to reconsider its entire compulsory· confinement 
process in light of the court's recently developed principles.2~0 
SPECIAL DISPOSITIONS BASED ON.SOCIAL STATUS 
In another category of cases legislatures have authorized special dis-
positions which only can be rationalized in terms of the social status of 
the individuals selected for these special processes. For example, in estab-
lishing a system of dispositions under the Federal Youth Corrections 
Act,211 Congress has assumed that a youth convicted of a crime is in need 
of specialized disposition because of his age.212 Likewise, indeterminate 
sentences for women who commit the same offense for which men re-
ceive definite terms represent similar legislative assumptions about the 
causes -of female crime that justify specialized dispositions. The notion 
206 See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 31B, §§ S,9(b) (1971). 
207 407 U.S. at 249-50. The Court specifically did not reach McNeil's claim that his 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been violated by the effect 
given to his refusal to submit to psychiatric and psychological testing. To have invalidated 
the commitment on fifth amendment grounds would have required the Court to define 
the scope of an individual's right not to cooperate with a dispositional process which 
requires him to cooperate in receiving treatment.·Whether the state may use the con-
tempt power to force the individual to submit to the examination likewise was not 
decided by the Court. Set; id. at 250-51. . 
208 See Murel v. Baltimore City Grim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355 (1972). 
209 Cf. id. at 357-58. 
210 Id. at 358. 
21118 u.s.c. §§ 5005-26 (1970). 
212 See id. § SOlO (sentencing). 
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of a family offense that is adjudicated and disposed of outside the crim-
inal process is based on conceptions of how both the assaulter and the 
victim view the conduct because of their social status as members of the 
same family unit. 
Three fundamental issues are presented by these specialized disposi-
tional schemes. If the legislature is allowed to assume that an individual 
adjudged guilty of a crime is entided to a special form of disposition, the 
question arises whether the discretion of other dispositional officials must 
be restric~ed or expanded. Second, if the social status of the individual 
presents a legal basis for the state intervention and, upon a proper adjud-
ication, state control, the issue then becomes whether the whole process 
of criminal adjudication should be avoided. If the criminal process is 
avoided, then rational criteria should be developed both in terms of the 
reasons for diverting individuals from the criminal process and the pur-
pose of the state processes in which the individual finds himself. Third, 
while the criminal dispositional processes might be utilized to promo~e 
a concept of individual liberty, the differentiation of dispositional proc-
esses on the basis of an individual's social status raises the issue of the 
limits on processes which seek to promote a societal definition of the 
individual. 
Indefinite commitments for wo~en offenders and for youthful of-
fenders into adulthood213 present the issue of the need to expand or con-
tract the discretion of other dispositional officials to achieve the legisla-
tive goal. Judicial response in the case of youthful offenders has been to 
limit the discretion of judges and correctional officials to further the 
legislative goal. The courts apparendy are sympathetic to the legislative 
view that when the criminal offender is young, he is presumptively a 
candidate for reform. The judicial response to indeterminate terms for 
women without legally mandated parole eligibility reflects the increasing-
ly questionable status of legal distinctions based on sex. The court in 
Commonwealth v. Daniels214 viewed the evil in indeterminate sentencing 
for women to be the lack of trial judge discretion to "individualize" the 
sentence.215 Although _the court invalidated the scheme on the basis that 
there was no rational basis for the distinction in sentencing based on sex, 
the court seemingly desired only to replace board discretion i.vith dis-
cretion in the trial judge. 
Without considering the broader implications of sex as a basis for a 
213See id. 
214 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). 
215 I d. at 647, 243 A.2d at 403. 
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legal distinction, a better approach to the sentencing scheme is to re-
quire that the state bear the burden of jus!lfying a separate sentencing 
scheme for women. Such a. requirement forces the dispositional officials 
to present to the judiciary a. credible penal policy and evidence to justify 
it before the court passes on the validity of the legislative judgment that 
women should be sentenced differently than men. In addition, the re-
quirement also allows the dispositional officials to demonstrate to the 
judiciary that good faith efforts a.re being made toward achieving the 
penal goals set by the legislature. 216 
The criteria developed for special dispositional processes might be 
modeled on those adopted for the Federal Youth Correction Act by the 
District of Columbia courts,217 where the correctional officials have be-
come part of the sentencing process under a four step procedure.218 An 
individual within the statutory age limits is presumptively a candidate 
for the specialized disposition unless the judge can show that the youth 
is not a fit subject for special sentencing.219 On the basis of the presump-
tion, the judge must order a 60 day study to see if the individual is, in 
the opinion of his future custodians, a fit subject for the specialized dis-
position. Next, the correctional officials must present their plan of treat-
ment and establish the period of confinement necessary. Finally, the 
court must be furnished with certification that adequate space in an ap-
propriate facility exists for the individual. The apparent impetus for these 
procedures was the lack of adequate facilities in the District of Columbia. 
The court went funher and directed the utilization of other federal fa-
cilities throughout the country.220 
Before individuals are placed in specialized facilities, the dispositional 
criteria must seek to insure that the facilities can make at least a good 
faith effort toward their legislatively prescribed goals of disposition. The 
effect of the process developed in the District of Columbia may be to 
have some young persons incarcerated in reformatories or penitentiaries. 
A more important aspect of the procedures is to question whether offi-
cials given a. special dispositional function have the resources to achieve 
their goals. Until the courts invalidate the specialized dispositions for 
youths as they already have begun to do for women, the judicially de-
veloped procedures a.re necessary to insure that the specialized processes 
21GSee State v. Chambers, 68 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973); State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 
334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971). 
217 See United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (DD.C. 1971). 
218 I d. at 979-80. 
219 See United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722,724 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
220 336 F. Supp. at 981. 
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are administered in such a manner as to protect a concept of individual 
liberty within the legislatively defined dispositional goals.221 
Even where the legislature substitutes non-criminal processes for crim..: 
inal adjudication, the state processes still must be administered to protect 
an individual from the arbitrary exercise of state power. The Family Of-
fense Act of New York provides for the transfer of certain cases of 
simple assault between members of a family to family court.222 In exer-
cising its discretion to hear a case, however, the family court must em-
ploy criteria which prevent one family member from forcing another 
into the more coercive criminal process. Thus, due process might be 
violated if family court jurisdiction were based solely on whether the 
victim of the alleged assault wanted reconciliation.223 
More importantly, the Act recognizes the potential for resolving con-
flicts in non-criminal institutions and for restoring social order without 
utilizing the criminal processes of adjudication and disposition.224 Family 
court processes, unlike criminal adjudications, view the alleged assaulter 
in the context of a social function-father, husband, wife, or mother. 
The assumption behind the Family Offense Act could lead to a generally 
different view of criminal disposition if a family model of the criminal 
process were adopted. If the presumption of reconciliation between the 
victim and perpetrator of the crime of the family offense scheme is car-
ried over into the criminal context, a criminal process could be built on 
the assumption of ultimate reconcilability of interest between the state 
and the individual accused and convicted of the crime.225 Rather than 
assuming that a new type of criminal process can be achieved solely 
through ideological innovation, the family offense scheme does serve as 
a reminder that societal goals in implementing criminal processes do not 
dictate necessarily that the most coercive forms of state control be em-
ployed. If restoring the social order in terms of the individual offender 
and the state is what is meant by reform or rehabilitation, the disposi-
tional policy maker will have to consider the ability of society to re-
establish its norms without criminal disposition. 
221 But see United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519 (DD.C. 1971). 
222 The Act provides in part: "The family court has exclusive original jurisdiction •• , 
over any proceeding concerning acts which would constitute disorderly conduct, harass-
ment, menacing, reckless endangerment, an assault or an attempted assault between 
spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or house-
hold." N.Y. FAMILY CoURT Acr § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
223 See In re Montalvo v. Montalvo, 55 Misc. 2d 699, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Family Ct. 
1968). 
224See People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108,:261 N.E.2d 637, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1970). 
225 See Griffiths, supra note 32, at 373. 
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PART IV 
A SuMMARY AND SoME UNANSWERED QUEsTIONS 
The proposed analysis would replace official discretion at sentencing 
with judicially created standards for sentencing officials. No single legal 
standard can replace the doctrine of official discretion since sentencing 
involves a variety of officials with different legal functions. As demon-
strated in this article these officials are judges, administrators, and leg-
islators. Since sentencing is viewed more broadly as a form of legal de-
cision making, it is possible to summarize the recommended standards 
and acknowledge the unanswered questions in terms of the officials en-
gaged in sentencing. 
JUDICIARY 
Assuming that the legislature has established a maximum and minimum 
range of dispositions upon conviction,226 four problem areas have been 
delineated as appropriate for appellate rather than trial judge decision 
making. 
Incarceration versus N on-incttrceration. Appellate courts should 
employ an interest analysis to develop dispositional policy to guide the 
decision to grant or withhold probation. If the interest at stake in dis-
positional policy is the concept of individual liberty, there should be a 
presumption favoring-the grant of probation at sentencing. If the interest 
is that of protecting the state processes, the trial ju~ge presumptively 
should sentence the offender to some period of incarceration.227 Narrow-
ly drawn secondary rules might be developed to mitigate or aggravate 
the sentence when the primary decision is probation or -incarceration.228 
Appellate courts can use a system of primary a~d secondary rules to ex-
plain the differences in sentences in tenns of overall dispositional policy. 
Furthermore, the system of articulated appellate rules will guide trial 
judge decisions in cases which will not require appellate review. 
Use of Prior Convictions -in Trial Judge Sentencing. The rec-
ommended use of prior convictions at sentencing demonstrates how a 
226 It should be noted that even in the California system, the decision to incarcerate 
could be governed by rules of disposition. See In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 498 P.2d 997, 
102 Cal. Rptr. 749 (i972). ·- ·. 
227 The article does not discuss the crimes against private property and bodily securitj 
directly. The basic analysis could be used to develop iules for probation. However, 
with so many crimes in these broad categories the analysis might be more crime-specific. 
For instance, probation might be appropriate for simple assault but not for aggravated 
assault. 
228 See D. THoMAs, PRINCIPLES oF SEN1ENCING 35-70. 
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system of articulated rules can change present practice. The use of prior 
convictions to enhance the disposition of an individual should be elim-
inated. However, an individual should be allowed to use the lack of prior 
convictions as a secondary rule of mitigation. Thus, where the primary 
decision already has been made in favor of incarceration, the individual 
should be able to argue to the trial judge and to the appellate court that 
he should not receive the maximum penalty because of the lack of prior 
convictions. H some decision maker is to assume that the prior convic-
tions are evidence of individual dangerousness, the legislature must estab-
lish the appropriate system of disposition for such individuals.229 
Multiple Sentences. An interest analysis should be used when 
individuals have been convicted under a multiple-count indictment. A 
single general sentence is the recommended disposition where multiple 
counts represent violations of one particular interest of the criminal 
law.2ao 
Privilege of Non-Cooperation. A major purpose of sentencing 
rules is to clarify whether a particular dispositional policy interferes with 
an individual's right of non-cooperation. By construing rules so that they 
do not infringe on the individual's right not to cooperate with state 
processes, the courts can use sentencing rules to influence the conduct 
of other officials in the criminal law process. Although this article has 
not attempted to define the scope of the .fifth amendment privilege at 
sentencing, the analysis has demonstrated that the issue of non-coopera-
tion is part of dispositional decision making.231 
Some Unanswered Questions. In what might be called the 
"process" aspects of the model, at least two types of questions remain 
unresolved. Assuming that some of the broad policy decisions recom-
mended were adopted by an appellate court, the nature of the hearing 
which takes place before the sentencing judge still must be delineated. 
The adversary notion of adjudication is not necessarily required since 
the model assumes a distinction between criminal adjudication and crim-
inal disposition. Nor is the standard of proof used in criminal adjudica-
229 See note 110 supra and accompanying text. 
230 The article has not discussed the problems of the defendant charged with crimes 
in two or more jurisdictions and how that individual should be handled in the legal 
system. Whether there should be rules of disposition to govern this case as there arc 
rules of adjudication is not discussed. Cf. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (state 
with a pending charge against an individual is required to provide a speedy trial upon 
demand). 
231 See Williams v. United States, 295 A.2d 503 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972). 
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cion appropriate for dispositional decision making.232 The form of a 
sentencing hearing might depend upon further exploration of whether 
disclosure of all or portions of the pre-sentence reports is required. 
Furthermore, if one of the rules of sentencing has been violated by a 
trial judge, the issue of whether the appellate court should mandate the 
appropriate sentence or remand for resentencing has not been resolved. 
The choice between the two courses of action might depend upon the 
nature of the particular rule violated or whether the appellate court has 
the pre-sentence report as part of the record on appeal. 
The model has left vast areas of the substance of rules of disposition 
unexplored. The secondary principles, particularly those that should 
govern the length of incarceration within the statutory maximum, have 
not been discussed.233 However, the analysis suggests that appellate rule 
malcing must consider what the judiciary has done or should do to the 
correction process. In addition, the court should consider what new al-
ternatives to incarceration the legislature may have created. Were an ap-
pellate court willing to adopt a new policy for disposition, the question 
of the retroactivity of the new rule would have to be resolved. Under the 
analysis offered, however, the court would not be bound by the consti-
tutional doctrines of retroactivity developed for adjudication.234 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
While the role of the judiciary in the correction process recendy has 
increased, instances of judicial intervention would be rare if administra-
tive decisions were guided by creative judicial decision making. The re-
sponsibility could be shifted back to the criminal administrative agencies 
without diminishing the importance of a concept of individual liberty 
within the state confinement processes. 
232 Justice Douglas, who dissented in Murel, cited In re Winship and suggested that 
the burden of proof necessary to commit under the Maryland statute should be proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 359-65 
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But to the 
degree that the majority opinion in Winship established proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt because that standard of proof gave f.oundation to the presumption of innocence, 
Justice Douglas' analysis of Winship is faulty. If the use of the defective delinquent 
statute assumes a valid conviction, meaning the presumption of innocence has been over-
come, why protect that presumption at disposition? This is not to suggest that the com-
mitment standards of the defective delinquent statutes may not be invalid for other 
reasons, nor is it meant to suggest the problems of appropriate standards o£ proof for 
disposition generally have been resolved. . 
233 See People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 ~.W.2d 202 (1972). 
234See Michigan v. Payne, 41 U.S.L.W. 4671 (U.S. May 21, 1973) (North Carolina v. 
Pearce held not retroactive). 
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Intra-Prison Discipline. A court should require that the system 
of intra-prison discipline proposed in this article be adopted. A state-
wide department of corrections could provide appellate review for each 
institution's disciplinary system. Each institution, however, should be 
required to establish its own rules so that the intra-prison system could 
perform a socializing 'function when infractions occur. As a reviewing 
agency of the first instance, the department may be able to correct abuses 
of individual officials in given cases and review challenges to the rules 
themselves. The role of courts would be somewhat more limited. The 
courts would review the operation of the total system and the rules to 
correct improper interferences with an individual's liberty. 
Parole Bom·d Decisions to Deny Release. Judicial review of pa-
role decision making should encourage the development of rational cri-
teria for denial of parole. The decision to deny parole could be justified 
in terms of the totality of the individual's criminal conduct, his record 
of intra-prison disciplinary action, and the psychiatric or other expert 
prognosis of parole success or failure. The interjection of a concept of 
individual liberty into this decision making process justifies a more active 
judicial role than with other administrative agencies. The criteria used 
by the board are not the only important considerations for review by the 
judiciary; the process by which cases are decided-particularly doubt-
ful cases-is of equal importance. The courts should not force any par-
ticular view of the correction process upon parole boards, but rather 
must emphasize the law's concern that the concept of individual liberty 
be maximized in deciding doubtful cases. 
Some Unanswered Questions. The limitations proposed on ad-
ministrative criminal discretion do not require that every decision within 
the correction process be conducted in accordance with the analysis 
suggested. For instance, a decision refusing to grant the status of work 
release might not be cognizable by the judiciary. Judicial review might 
tend to destroy the use of a risk analysis in the selection of inmates who 
merit work release, and a judicial requirement of written reasons for the 
denial and criteria for the decision may be unwise. The state-wide de-
partment of corrections, however, may be justified in reviewing the 
denial under limited conditions. If, for instance, the state-wide depart-
ment were trying to determine what types ·of individuals were successful 
on work release, review of the institutional decisions might be a means 
of gathering information. 
Similarly, the question might arise whether work release status, once 
granted, can be revoked without reasons or without standards for the 
1973] SENTENCING -. s:r 
decision. If judicial review of this rev-ocation were viewed as interfering 
with the type of risk analysis legislatively mandated in the original de-
cision to grant work release, such review should not ·be undertakenl 
When the decision is alleged to be on impermissible grounds, such as the 
religious practices of certain inmates, the judiciary may be required to 
review the particular decision in order to protect -one of .the individual's 
cognizable rights. 
A constitutional analysis cannot address all the issues surrounding pa-
role denials. Other kinds of rules based on the various policies should be 
developed to determine the circumstances under which a refusal to sub-
mit to a psychiatric diagnosis can justify a denial -of parole.235 Similarly, 
some standards for determining the reliability of the information used 
by the parole board should be developed.236 These standards must be de-
signed to control the work of officials who prepared the reports. 
ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE 
The major role for the legislatures under the model of criminal dis~ 
position is to develop alternatives to present dispositions. The .first chal-
lenge to the legislature is to _reconstruct the variety 9f civil commitment 
processes to conform to the notions -of protecting individual liberty al-
ready promulgated by the judiciary. . 
A second challenge to the legislatures willing to accept the view tha~ 
criminal dispositions have .limited utility is to consider establishing dis-
positions that use the resources of the larger society. A program to estab-
lish some community-based institutions· for certain legislatively defined 
groups of individuals is ripe for legislative consideration under the model's 
assumptions. The model's usefulness to a legislature considering new pro-, 
posals is the emphasis placed on establishing appropriate criteria in the 
definition of the group that might qualify for disposition under commuri~ 
ity-based programs or new alternatives of lesser forms of state contiol.23~ 
Whether the legislature should concern itself with modifying the judi~ 
cial rules of disposition which are n-ot of constitutional dimension-depends 
upon one's view of the efficacy of the legislative process. My own view 
is that were the legislature dissatisfied with any specific judicial rule of 
disposition, it would have to reconsider the nature of the substantive of..: 
235 See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 241, 252 (Douglas, J., con'-
curring). 
236 Cf. State v. Kunz, 55 N.].128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969). 
237 Legislatures could consider authorizing forms of non-incarceration other than pro.: 
bation supervision, perhaps even to the extent ·of not applying state control in some 
czes. In such cases, the criminal adjudication would be viewed as having served the 
societal need for control. · · ; 
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fertse under the interest' analysis proposed. Legislative dissatisfaction with 
rules of judicial disposition provides an opportunity for reexamination 
of the substantive crime to insure that the conduct should be controlled 
through the criminal law or has been properly classified by the judiciary 
in the establishment of judicial dispositional policy. 
, The aim of this article has been to develop alternatives to the doctrine 
of judicial discretion in sentencing. What has been proposed is a new 
mode of legal analysis, a model of criminal dispositions. As a method of 
scholarship, the view of legal decision making advocated by this article 
has three advantages. By illuminating the unique features of sentencing 
as a legal decision, the model aids in determining what type of legal 
principles are appropriate to achieve the law's purposes. Legal scholar-
ship, with a better functional understanding of the legal rules of criminal 
disposition, should be better able to use information and perspectives 
from other disciplines.238 Furthermore, the rules and principles recom-
mended as alternatives under the model combine substance and procedure 
since the doctrine of trial judge discretion represents a certain institu-
tional resolution. The recommended realignment of institutional respon-
sibility gives a prominent role to the appellate judiciary,239 while increas-
238 The influence of economic reasoning might be applied usefully to some problems 
of criminal dispositions. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 
1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1972). But such an integration of law and economics first as-
sumes a £unctional understanding of law and legal rules as Professor Calabresi and Mr. 
Melamed have demonstrated in their analysis of the variety of legal rules that might 
be applied to the problem of pollution. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 43. Of particu-
lar interest is the authors' discussion of why the legal system needs criminal sanctions 
to protect interests such as property interests when civil rules also protect those interests. 
ld. at 1124-27. But see Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Just Compensation: Towards 
a Sanction Law of the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 256-67 (1968). Professor Frankel sug· 
gests that a unitary view of the civil and penal systems of confinement should lead to 
compensation to those involuntarily committed to mental institutions to protect the 
public from deprivation of their liberty. Id. at 257. But if persons are compensated f.or 
deprivations of liberty, would this lead to the extinction of what Professor Calabresi and 
Mr. Melamed call ''property rules" and rules of "inalienability?" 
Legal philosophy would appear to be of great relevance to a further study of sen-
tencing. But until the broad school of legal philosophies allows the unique feature of. a 
legal system, legal decision making, to enter its debates, the influence of legal philosophy 
on sentencing will be small. Professor Graham Hughes, without specific references to 
the problems of sentencing, has noted the failure of legal philosophers to examine the 
nature of legal reasoning and decision making. See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision-
Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 439 n.22 (1968). A meaningful integration of legal philosophy 
and judicial dispositional rules is beyond the scope of this article although certainly 
worthy o£ further study. Mter all, Judge Frankel's characterization of the present prac-
tice of sentencing as "lawlessness" assumes we know what we mean by "law." 
239 See United States v. Bradley, 93 S.Ct. 1151 (1973). This is one example of the inter-
play of legislative, judicial, and administrative functions in criminal dispositions. The 
Court interpreted the effect of the saving clause of the new Federal Comprehensive Drug 
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ing the responsibility of the legislative and administrative branches in 
some areas. Finally, although the model of criminal dispositions is recom-
mended as the alternative, the model does not solve all the important 
questions of sentencing. Perhaps the model's greatest contribution as a 
new mode of legal analysis is its ability to generate new questions and 
define the perimeters of their resolution. 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 that would have eliminated the mandatory sentence 
of incarceration in petitioner's case. The petitioner had been sentenced after the effective 
date of the new act. However, the Court, in holding that petitioner was properly sen-
tenced under the old act, reasoned that sentencing was part of the prosecution, the op-
erative word of the saving clause o£ the new act. The Court left open the question of 
whether the more stringent parole requirements of the old act would apply to the 
petitioner's case, apparently on the theory that prosecution may not include the cor-
rectional process. Id. at 1156 n.6; see United States v. De Simone, 468 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
